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I. INTRODUCTION
"Taxation is a most flexible and effective but also a dangerous instru-
ment of social reform. One has to know precisely what one is doing
lest the results diverge greatly from one's intentions."'
The revelation that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had sub-
jected conservative groups to heightened scrutiny in its examination of
such groups' applications for tax-exempt status is the latest, but not
the only, political controversy spawned by IRS actions with respect to
* Professor of Law, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
+ GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE POLIrCAL ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THE-
ORY 188 (Paul Streeten trans., 2002).
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section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations.' Members of the
American Bar Association revealed, at a meeting in the spring of
2011, that the IRS had sent letters to several of their clients notifying
them that they would be audited for gift tax liability in connection
with their contributions to section 501(c)(4) organizations. 2 The IRS
later acknowledged that five donors were undergoing such audits and
that the decision to audit these donors was made without any interfer-
ence from anyone outside the IRS.3 Several Republican members of
the Senate Finance Committee questioned the Commissioner of the
IRS about whether any political appointees had influenced the deci-
sion to undertake the aforementioned audits.4 Despite the Commis-
sioner's assurances that no political influence was exerted upon the
IRS, Representative Dave Camp, chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, intimated that the timing of the audits, after years
of IRS somnolence, suggested that the audits amounted to an attack
on constitutionally protected political speech.5 The IRS soon termi-
nated its efforts and indicated that no further examinations of such
gift tax issues would be undertaken until further notice.6
The IRS has long insisted that political contributions are subject to
a gift tax. However, its enforcement record in this respect has been
sporadic at best. Its first official pronouncement in this regard oc-
curred more than thirty-five years after the enactment of the gift tax,
and serious enforcement efforts were made for a brief period in the
aftermath of the Nixon administration's campaign finance abuses.7
However, before those efforts could bear fruit, Congress amended the
1. See John D. McKinnon, Siobhan Hughes & Damian Paletta, Higher-Ups Knew of IRS Case,
WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2013, 7:14 PM). See also infra notes 361-63 and accompanying text. Un-
less otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
2. Ellen P. Aprill, Once and Future Gift Taxation of Transfers to Section 501(c) (4) Organiza-
tions: Current Law, Constitutional Issues, and Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 289, 291 (2012).
3. Id. at 291-92. See also Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Moves to Tax Gifts to Groups Active in
Politics, N.Y. TIMEs (May 12, 2011).
4. Aprill, supra note 2, at 292.
5. Id. at 291-92. See also AM. BAR. Ass'N., COMMENTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS COMMITTEE'S TASK FORCE ON SECTION 501(c)(4) AND POLITIcs 13
(May 25, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2004/040525exo.pdf (noting
that there was no evidence of IRS enforcement of the gift tax on donations to section 501(c)(4)
entities for at least a decade). The IRS recently admitted that it had subjected certain conserva-
tive groups to inappropriate scrutiny in its review of their applications for § 501(c)(4) status. See
infra notes 361-63 and accompanying text.
6. Aprill, supra note 2, at 292-93. See also John D. McKinnon & Dionne Searcey, IRS also
Targeted Donors to GOP Group, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2013).
7. See Kip Dellinger, Gift Tax on Political Contributions? A Lousy Idea!, 78 TAX NOTES 621
(1998). See also infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
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gift tax statutes to preclude the imposition of gift taxes on donations
to political organizations.8
Seismic changes in the legal landscape dramatically altered cam-
paign finance practices during the 1970s, but political organizations-
be they political parties, national or state political committees, or can-
didate committees-remained the vessels that received political con-
tributions.9 As a result, the gift tax issue disappeared as an issue in
campaign finance. The increasing importance of "soft money" dona-
tions in the 1990s implicated political parties and, thus, the gift tax
issue remained dormant. The McCain-Feingold Act turned off the
"soft money" spigot and led to greater prominence of independent
political committees-the so called section 527 groups-that could
avoid classification as political committees for federal election law
purposes yet qualify as political organizations under the tax code.10
Thus, the gift tax issue remained in its bottle. However, the Supreme
Court's holding in Citizens United and a subsequent appellate court
decision led to increasing participation in electoral politics by section
501(c)(4) organizations." These organizations enjoy a significant ad-
vantage over section 527 organizations because they have no donor
disclosure requirements.12 However, section 501(c)(4) organizations
are not political organizations for purposes of the gift tax exemption. 13
Consequently, the gift tax issue resurfaced.
Part II of this Article traces the evolution of campaign finance prac-
tices. Prior to the 1970s, reform efforts were ineffective. The emer-
gence of television as a campaign tool accelerated the money chase
and, in conjunction with the excesses of the Nixon administration, led
to the passage of the first campaign finance legislation with teeth in
1974. However, the Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Buckley v.
Valeo, loosened the legislative strictures to which campaigns were
subject.14 This decision, along with later amendments to the 1974 leg-
islation, led to the emergence of political action committees (PACs)
and "soft money" as important factors in campaigns. The McCain-
Feingold Act was enacted, in part, to eliminate "soft money," reduce
the advantages of a candidate's personal wealth, and rein in the inde-
pendent activities that were sanctioned by Buckley. A decade of liti-
gation resulted in a significant evisceration of the reforms put in place
8. See infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 105-54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
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by the McCain-Feingold Act. The Court's 2010 decision in Citizens
United provided the legal foundation for unlimited independent ex-
penditures. Federal election and tax laws require political organiza-
tions to disclose their donors. Soon after Citizens United, political
actors turned to the section 501(c)(4) organization as a vehicle for
making independent political expenditures without the burden of do-
nor disclosure.
Part III of this Article provides an analysis of the gift tax in general
and its application to contributions to section 501(c)(4) organizations.
Despite the dearth of case law on this issue, it appears that taxing
contributions to these organizations has ample statutory support, and
the current regulations interpreting the statute should survive the def-
erential standard of review to which they are subject. Moreover, en-
forcement of the tax against donors to section 501(c)(4) organizations
does not do violence to the First Amendment. However, notwith-
standing the legal justification for enforcement of the tax, Part IV ar-
gues that the enforcement of the tax is unwarranted from a policy
standpoint. Enforcement of the gift tax with respect to contributions
to section 501(c)(4) organizations will not reduce politically motivated
giving because such giving will be diverted to vehicles to which dona-
tions are exempt from the gift tax. Moreover, large corporations, for
all practical purposes, will be unaffected by the gift tax thereby raising
the possibility that section 501(c)(4) organizations will remain a signif-
icant political force but one dominated by corporate donors. Perhaps
the most salient objection to enforcement of the tax is the risk that the
public comes to perceive enforcement of the tax as selective and polit-
ically motivated. The IRS recently has taken actions that, to its critics,
were politically motivated, and, for the most part, taxpayers are pow-
erless to challenge such actions. A tax system already suffering from a
lack of public respect can do without accusations of political meddling.
II. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM EFFORTS
A. Early Reform Efforts
Efforts to reform campaign finance have had limited efficacy since
the beginning of the republic. For most of our electoral history, legis-
lative attempts to curb the influence of money in elections were tooth-
less and ineffective. More recently, First Amendment obstacles and
the ingenuity of both candidates and donors have conspired to assure
that campaign finance reform legislation delivered less than promised
results.
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Early nineteenth century campaign practices, although quaint by
modern standards, share a disconcerting trait with modern practices: a
Darwinian-like ability to evolve to meet an ever-increasing need for
funds. Expansion of the electorate due to an influx of immigrants ne-
cessitated vehicles that could broadly disseminate political content.
Newspapers, subsidized by political parties and wealthy individuals,
that produced campaign messages masquerading as journalism were
those vehicles.15 Not coincidently, moneyed interests increased their
participation in political campaigns when government's participation
in economic affairs increased, beginning with President Andrew Jack-
son's promise to dismantle the Bank of the United States and continu-
ing with government Civil War procurement, post-war reconstruction,
and rapid industrialization.16 The "spoils system," introduced by Pres-
ident Jackson, created a source of campaign funds from grateful office
holders in the form of salary kickbacks to the political party that pro-
vided the patronage jobs.17 The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act,
which eliminated such patronage, served to heighten the relative clout
of big money donors.' 8
Like today, much opprobrium was directed at corporate participa-
tion in election financing. However, efforts to curb corporate political
activity were motivated by political payback, were narrowly focused,
and proved toothless.19 In 1907, Congress enacted the Tillman Act,
which prohibited national banks and federally chartered corporations
from contributing money "in connection with any election to any po-
litical office" and prohibited any corporation from contributing
money in connection with any U.S. presidential or congressional elec-
15. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALa. Gov'T L. REV. 1,
4-5 (2008). See also Benjamin S. Feuer, Comment, Between Political Speech and Cold, Hard
Cash: Evaluating the FEC's New Regulations for 527 Groups, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 925,932 (2006)
(noting that newspaper costs were the most significant campaign costs throughout the early part
of the nineteenth century).
16. Urofsky, supra note 15, at 7-8.
17. Id. at 8-9.
18. Id.
19. For example, several states carried by William Jennings Bryan in the 1896 presidential
election prohibited corporate campaign contributions in 1897 in large part as retaliation against
corporate support for William McKinley. Id. at 13. Post-Civil War reforms included the Navy
Appropriations Bill of 1867, which prohibited the solicitation of contributions from naval ship
yard workers, and an Executive Order issued by President Hayes in 1877 that prohibited politi-
cal assessments on federal employees. See Robert E. Mutch, Three Centuries of Campaign Fi-
nance Law, in A USER's GUIDE TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 12 (Gerald C. Lubenow ed.,
2001). See also Jon Simon Stefanuca, The Fall of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: A
Public Choice Explanation, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 237, 239 (2008).
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tion.20 Corporations avoided the strictures of the Tillman Act by
making donations in-kind.21
The Publicity of Political Contributions Act, enacted in 1910, re-
quired post-election disclosure of donations and was amended one
year later to put in place spending caps for House of Representatives
and Senate races.22 However, the statute applied only to donations
made in an election year and only to those donations made directly to
national party committees or to the candidate and, therefore, had lit-
tle effect in curbing donations to state party committees or to inde-
pendent committees formed to avoid the reach of the legislation.23
The Teapot Dome scandal contributed to the passage of the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, which closed the in-kind contribution
loophole created by the Tillman Act and extended the disclosure rules
of the Publicity of Political Contributions Act. However, this legisla-
tion failed to contain an enforcement mechanism and was rife with
easily exploitable loopholes.24
Organized labor became increasingly influential during the New
Deal era, and the employees of numerous public works programs,
who were not subject to the Pendleton Act's restrictions, provided the
Roosevelt administration with a vast pool of potential donors and
campaign participants.25 The Hatch Political Activity Act (Hatch
Act), enacted in 1939 in large part out of concern that President
Roosevelt was building a political base through the various public
works programs, extended the ban on political contributions and par-
ticipation to all federal employees, not just those employed in civil
service.26 The legislation was amended shortly thereafter to extend
the contribution ban to federal contractors and employees of state
agencies that were recipients of federal funding, cap contributions to
20. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (repealed in 1971).
21. Urofsky, supra note 15, at 17. The statute's failure to provide an enforcement mechanism,
in addition to its narrow focus on money contributions, assured continued corporate participa-
tion in elections. Id.
22. Publicity of Political Contributions Act of 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910); Publicity of
Political Contributions Act, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25 (1911). See also Urofsky, supra note 15, at 18.
23. Publicity of Political Contributions Act, 36 Stat. at 822-24. The Supreme Court held that
the Publicity of Political Contributions Act was unconstitutional in its application to primaries
and Senate races. See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921). The Court later held that
Congress can regulate primary elections. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317 (1941).
24. Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, §§ 301(d), 303--08, 43 Stat. 1070, 1071-73, repealed by Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972); Urofsky,
supra note 15, at 21. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971.
25. See Urofsky, supra note 15, at 25.
26. Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939). Urofsky, supra note 15, at 25.
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national committees, and place a spending limit on such committees.27
The Hatch Act restrictions proved ineffective.28 The War Labor Dis-
putes Act, enacted over President Roosevelt's veto in the aftermath of
the United Mine Workers strike during World War II, was narrow in
scope and merely prohibited labor unions from contributing to cam-
paigns for the duration of the war.29 However, one method of avoid-
ing this legislation had long-lasting implications: the use of political
action committees (PACs).30 The Taft-Hartley Act of 1946 made per-
manent the ban on labor union contributions and prohibited all corpo-
rate political expenditures.31
Television reduced the influence of political parties by placing a
premium on the candidates' personal characteristics, and the new me-
dium's power as a campaign tool was brought into stark relief by the
Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960.32 Television also greatly increased
the expense of campaigns, causing cyclical fund-raising efforts to
evolve into a permanent fund-raising process.33 Little effort at cam-
paign reform was expended in the 1950s and 1960s, but major changes
came in the 1970s, the most significant of which were in response to
the Watergate scandal and other Nixon administration shenanigans.
B. Modern Reform Efforts
The more recent history of campaign reform efforts has shown that
legislative or judicial developments lead to behavioral adjustments by
political actors. Professors Issacharoff and Karlan aptly captured the
futility of reform efforts over a decade before the Supreme Court's
controversial decision in Citizens United.34
27. Urofsky, supra note 15 at 25-26. The contribution and spending limitations were repealed
by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
28. Urofsky, supra note 15, at 25-26.
29. War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943).
30. Corporations made little use of these vehicles initially due to the lack of enforcement of
existing restrictions and the uncertainty over the legality of PACs. See Urofsky, supra note 15, at
28-29.
31. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, §§ 304, 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60
(1947). The Taft-Hartley Act also prohibited internal union communications with members with
respect to elections. Id. However, the Supreme Court held that the legislation did not operate
to ban internal union communication. See United States v. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106
(1948). See also Urofsky, supra note 15, at 28.
32. Urofsky, supra note 15, at 31.
33. Democrats' and Republicans' combined spending on presidential elections grew to almost
$37 million for the 1968 election from approximately $5 million for the 1948 election. The 1972
presidential election cost approximately $91 million. Senate and House election campaign
spending also grew dramatically. Id. at 41-42.
34. See infra notes 105-54 and accompanying text.
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Electoral reform is a graveyard of well-intentioned plans gone awry.
It doesn't take an Einstein to discern a First Law of Political Ther-
modynamics-the desire for political power cannot be destroyed,
but at most, channeled into different forms-nor a Newton to iden-
tify a Third Law of Political Motion-every reform effort to con-
strain political actors produces a corresponding series of reactions
by those with power to hold onto it.3 5
The foundational statutes, the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974 and the McCain-Feingold Act, dramatically al-
tered the campaign finance landscape. 36 In addition, the Supreme
Court has played a significant role in the evolution of campaign fi-
nance practices. The seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo has loomed
large over campaign finance reform efforts for more than three de-
cades.37 Citizens United v. FEC, a relative newcomer to the campaign
scene, has already proven its mettle as a case with far-reaching impli-
cations.38 Generally, the legislative and judicial developments over
the past forty years have resulted in a system first dominated by hard
money donations to political parties and PACs and later dominated by
soft money donations to political parties. More recently, outside
groups have become a major force in electoral politics. Until Citizens
United, the regulation of campaign expenditures turned on whether or
not the expenditures funded express advocacy.39 After Citizens
United, the regulatory linchpin was no longer whether express advo-
cacy took place but whether the expenditures in question were coordi-
nated with the candidate. 40 Thus, independent groups were free to
openly advocate for a candidate.
1. From Hard Money to Soft Money
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was enacted with the
dual purpose of reigning in the spiraling costs of presidential and con-
gressional elections and enhancing candidates' accessibility to mass
media.41 This legislation focused on the disclosure of individual con-
tributions and attempted to curb the advantages enjoyed by wealthy
35. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (1999).
36. See infra notes 47-52, 77-104 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 105-54 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
41. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)); S. REP. No. 92-229, at 2 (1971). The Revenue Act of 1971 put in place
public funding of presidential campaigns through voluntary taxpayer contributions, although im-
plementation was delayed until the 1976 election. See Urofsky, supra note 15, at 40, 49. In
addition, The Revenue Act of 1971 provided an individual tax credit or, alternatively, a deduc-
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candidates.42 The Act defined the term "political committee" very
broadly, liberalized the definition of political contributions and ex-
penditures, and allowed bona-fide loans to political candidates.43 The
Act left undisturbed the long-standing prohibitions on corporate and
union contributions, but limitations on individual contributions to na-
tional committees and the spending limits imposed on such commit-
tees, imposed by the Hatch Act, were repealed and replaced by
spending limitations on the candidates directly.44 Like the reform ef-
forts that preceded it, the legislation failed either to create an effective
enforcement mechanism or to regulate all expenditures that could as-
sist a campaign. 4 5 The legislation was criticized as a pro-incumbency
measure. 46
tion for political contributions. Both provisions were repealed in 1986. See Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 112(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
42. Title I of the Act limited the amount that broadcast and non-broadcast media could
charge political candidates. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103,
86 Stat. 3, 4 (1972). Moreover, a legally qualified candidate was prohibited from spending funds
for the use of communication media in excess of an amount based on the voting age population
of the geographic area in which the election for office was held or $50,000, whichever was
greater, and spending on broadcast media was limited to sixty percent of the total media commu-
nication spending limit. Id. § 104, 86 Stat. at 5. Title III of the Federal Election Campaign Act
imposed detailed disclosure requirements on political committees that were administered by the
U.S. Comptroller General, including the disclosure of all donors who contributed $100 or more
to a political committee. Id. § 301, 86 Stat. at 11-19.
43. The statute defined a political committee as "any individual, committee, association, or
organization which accepts contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an
aggregate amount exceeding $1,000." Id. § 201, 86 Stat. at 8, repealed by Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 93-187, § 201(a)(1), 93 Stat. 1367 (1980). A contri-
bution was defined as:
[A] gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value (except a
loan of money by a national or State bank made in accordance with the applicable
banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of business), made for the
purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any person to Fed-
eral office . ...
Id. § 201, 86 Stat. at 8, repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979
§ 201(a)(1)). Expenditures were similarly defined. Id. § 201, 86 Stat. at 9, repealed by Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979 § 201(a)(1).
44. The statute prohibited a candidate from making expenditures from his personal funds or
the personal funds of his immediate family in excess of $50,000 for presidential or vice-presiden-
tial candidates, and $35,000 and $25,000 for Senate and House of Representatives candidates,
respectively. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 § 201, 86 Stat. at 9-10, repealed by Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496.
45. Stefanuca, supra note 19, at 266-67.
46. The spending limitations on media purchases and the permissibility of bank financing pro-
vided a pro-incumbency slant to the legislation-one commentator likened Congress' behavior
to that of an "oil cartel." Id. at 253. Spending limitations provided an obstacle to challengers in
overcoming the advantages of incumbents who, not coincidentally, were usually in a better posi-
tion to secure now-permissible bank financing.
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However, Watergate and other associated Nixon administration
malfeasance ushered in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974.47 This legislation and later amendments prohibited po-
litical committees, other than a candidate's principal campaign
committee, from contributing more than $5000 to any candidate with
respect to any election for federal office, imposed a $1000 limit on the
amount any person could contribute to any candidate with respect to
any election for federal office, and limited aggregate individual contri-
butions during any calendar year to $25,000.48 In addition to the con-
tribution limits, the amendments also imposed spending caps on
various parties.49 The 1974 amendments also clarified the legal status
of PACs, which had been established by labor unions as early as
1943.50 Significantly, and in contrast to previous reforms, the 1974
47. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974).
48. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112, 90 Stat.
475, 488 (1976) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2005)); Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974, § 101, 88 Stat. at 1263 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (2006)). The statute was
amended, in the wake of Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), to
modify the definition of contributions to include "expenditures made by any person in coopera-
tion, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized
political committees, or their agents. . . ." Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976
§ 112, 90 Stat. at 488 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i)). Further amendments in 1976
placed a $20,000 limitation on contributions to national political party committees and a $5000
limitation on contributions to other political committees. See id. § 112, 90 Stat. at 487 (codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006)). The limitations on contributions to political committees that engage
in independent advocacy were, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), struck down by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
49. Spending limits were imposed on candidates, committees authorized by the candidate to
make expenditures, national and state committees of political parties, and certain persons au-
thorized by the candidate or by an authorized committee to make expenditures. Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, § 101, 88 Stat. at 1264-65 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(c) (2006)). The limits, which were adjusted for inflation, were set at $10,000,000 and
$20,000,000 for presidential primaries and the presidential election, respectively. Senate and
House of Representatives elections were subject to lower limits. Id. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1264-65
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2006)). The spending limits imposed on the use of a
candidate's own funds and the funds of his immediate family by the 1971 legislation were left in
place, although loans that were evidenced by a written instrument were permitted. Id. § 101, 88
Stat. at 1266 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2006)). The Act also placed a $1000 limit on
independent political expenditures that was later struck down by the Supreme Court. Id. § 101,
88 Stat. at 1265 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (2006)); see infra note 59 and accompanying text.
The contribution limits for donations were later increased and indexed for inflation by the Mc-
Cain-Feingold Act. See infra note 83.
50. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 103, 88 Stat.
1263, 1272 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 611 (2006)). This provision codified the Supreme Court's
decision in Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972), which held that
the 1971 legislation permitted union officials to administer PACs. A 1975 FEC advisory opinion
that allowed Sun Oil, a corporation, to spend corporate funds in order to solicit contributions to
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amendments did include an effective enforcement mechanism: the
Federal Election Commission (FEC).51 The FEC was provided with
formidable enforcement powers, rule-making authority, and the au-
thority to issue advisory opinions.52
The combination of higher contribution limits for donations to po-
litical parties and the ability of national and state parties to spend sig-
nificantly more funds than other political actors resulted in a more
prominent fundraising role for the political parties. Amendments en-
acted in 1979 allowed donors to contribute an unlimited amount of
funds to political parties for certain party building activities-the "soft
money" activities that would later provide the impetus for the enact-
ment of the McCain-Feingold Act.53
Many of the reform provisions were undone by the landmark case
of Buckley v. Valeo.5 4 At issue in the case was the constitutionality of
various contribution and expenditure limits imposed by the 1974 legis-
lation and the disclosure rules of the 1971 and 1974 Acts.55 The Court
its PAC from stockholders and employees provided a significant boost to PAC funding. See FEC
Advisory Opinion 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,879 (July 29, 1975).
51. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, § 208, 88 Stat. at 1280 (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 437c). The FEC is comprised of six voting members, no more than three of which can
be affiliated with the same political party, and two non-voting ex-officio members. Id. § 208, 88
Stat. at 1280-81 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c). Legislation enacted in 1976 provided that the
voting members of the FEC were to be appointed by the President. See Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-283, § 101, 90 Stat. 475 (1976) (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)). Legislation enacted in 1997 limited commissioners to one six-year term.
See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-61,
§ 512(a), 111 Stat. 1272, 1305 (1997) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2)(A)).
52. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, § 208, 88 Stat. at 1282-85 (codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 437d).
53. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 101, 93
Stat. 1339, 1341-50 (1980) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(b)(B)(v)(viii)-(xi)). See also Urofsky,
supra note 15, at 61-62; see infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
54. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
55. Id. at 6. The Supreme Court found that the government's interest in providing the electo-
rate information upon which to cast their votes, deterring corruption through exposure, and
providing enforcement authorities with essential information was sufficient to justify the disclo-
sure requirements of the 1971 and 1974 Acts. However, future "as applied" challenges to the
requirements were not precluded in the event that the disclosure requirements exposed mem-
bers or supporters of historically suspect organizations to reprisal, the possibility of which the
Court was well aware. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Less than a decade
after Buckley, the Court struck down an Ohio law that required every political party to report
the names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign contributions.
The Court held that the exposure of corruption made possible by disclosure rules had little rele-
vance to minor parties given their unlikelihood of success at the polls. Brown v. Socialist Work-
ers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 95 (1982). The history of harassment against the Socialist
Workers Party convinced the Court that the potential misuse of the required information out-
weighed the government's interest in obtaining the information. Id. at 100-02. However, in a
recent case, the Court rejected a facial challenge to Washington's Public Records Act under
which the names and addresses of individuals that signed a petition to initiate a referendum to
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distinguished between contributions and expenditures for purposes of
First Amendment protection. 56 Reasonable limitations could be im-
posed on political contributions because the avoidance of the "actual-
ity and appearance of corruption resulting from large financial
contributions" was a sufficient compelling interest to justify infringe-
ments upon First Amendment liberties.57 To the Court, such limita-
tions were narrowly tailored to meet the government's compelling
interest of preventing actual or perceived corruption because they fo-
cused "precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions."5 8
In contrast, the Court held that the primary effect of the $1000 limi-
tation on independent expenditures, the limitation on expenditures by
candidates from personal or family resources, and the limitation on
overall campaign expenditures "is to restrict the quantity of campaign
speech by individuals, groups, and candidates" and, therefore, vio-
lated the First Amendment.59 According to the Court, neither the
government's anti-corruption interest in limiting expenditures nor the
government's interest in equalizing both the ability of individuals to
influence the outcome of elections and the financial resources of com-
peting candidates were compelling enough to justify the limitations.60
The Court, in its examination of whether the independent expendi-
ture limitation was unconstitutionally vague, left what proved to be a
long-lasting legacy. The 1974 Act defined such expenditures as "any
expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate . . . advocat-
ing the election or defeat of such candidate .".. ."61 The Court found
that this language was impermissibly vague and, in order to preserve
the statutory provision, held that the provision must be interpreted to
cover only "expenditures for communications that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat" of a candidate.62 The Court pro-
vided examples of express advocacy-the so-called magic words-
which would later prove significant in the enactment of, and disputes
overturn a recently enacted domestic partner statute would be disclosed. See Doe v. Reed, 130
S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
56. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1974).
57. Id. at 26.
58. Id. at 30. The Court rejected the argument that the $1000 contribution limitation was
unreasonably low. Id. The Court also rejected the assertion that contribution limitations were a
form of discrimination that favored incumbents. Id. at 30-31.
59. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
60. Id. at 17, 55.
61. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat.
1263, 1265.
62. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
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over, the McCain-Feingold Act.6 3 Buckley ushered in the era of un-
regulated issue advocacy and the explosion of "soft money" to fund
such advocacy. 64
Political parties, as a result of the 1974 and 1976 amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act, enjoyed an advantage over individu-
als who were limited to $1000 contributions to candidates, 65 corpora-
tions and labor unions that could not donate directly to candidates at
all,66 and PACs that could donate up to $5000 to candidates. 67 The
limitations on donations to political parties were far more generous.68
Moreover, parties had the unique ability to undertake coordinated ex-
penditures.69 Not surprisingly, coordinated expenditures undertaken
by the parties dwarfed direct contributions to candidates by political
parties.70 In addition, certain grass roots activities by state party com-
mittees, such as voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts, were
subject to no spending limitation at all.7 '
63. The Court defined express advocacy to include words or phrases such as "vote for,"
"elect," "support," "defeat," and "reject." Id. at 44 n.52.
64. The fact that Buckley was interpreted to place issue advocacy beyond the reach of regula-
tors may be criticized. The Court, by limiting the reach of the statute to the "magic words,"
merely prevented the statute from being unconstitutionally vague. Nothing in the Court's opin-
ion suggested that clear, unambiguous statutory language that limited speech beyond the "magic
words" would necessarily violate the First Amendment.
64. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
66. An exception was created for so-called "MCFL" corporations. See infra note 82.
67. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
68. Id.
69. Coordinated expenditures are deemed contributions to the candidates and, consequently,
are subject to the stringent contribution limits. Therefore, individuals, corporations, labor un-
ions, and PACs are limited from undertaking coordinating activities in any meaningful way.
Buckley and the 1976 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 made clear
that coordinated expenditures could be regulated as contributions. See supra note 48 and ac-
companying text. In FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Il), 533 U.S.
431, 447, 451-53, 456 (2001), the Court upheld regulation of coordinated expenditures, noting
that political parties and candidates invariably work together, and describing coordinated ex-
penditures as the "functional equivalent" of contributions. Despite the difficulty in tying party
expenditures to corruption, the Court held that such expenditures may be limited "to minimize
circumvention of contribution limits" and that the necessity to prevent disguised contributions
was "a valid theory of corruption." Id. at 465. In an earlier case, Colorado I, the Court struck
down restrictions on independent expenditures by political parties. See infra note 72 and accom-
panying text.
70. Over the three election cycles between 1994 and 1998, direct Republican and Democratic
Party donations to candidates totaled $14.7 million, while both parties' combined coordinated
expenditures amounted to $129.4 million. See Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 626 (2000).
71. Coordination between state and national party committees allowed the state party com-
mittees to benefit from the national party committee's fund raising apparatus. See id.
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Despite the fact that, as a result of the Court's decision in Colorado
I, political parties could spend an unlimited amount on independent
expenditures, such expenditures were not utilized to a great extent
because the parties relied on a more effective tool: issue advocacy
funded by "soft money." 72 Express advocacy activities had to be
funded with "hard money" contributions, those raised within the con-
fines of the statutory contribution limitations. As a result of the 1979
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act and favorable
FEC decisions, state and national parties were able to raise funds
outside the strictures of the statute to fund administrative costs alloca-
ble to non-federal activities despite the fact that such activities also
tend to benefit candidates for federal office who appear on the same
ballot and candidates for state or local office. 7 3
Moreover, as a result of Buckley's holding that only express advo-
cacy expenditures could be regulated, "soft money" could fund issue
advocacy. 74 The FEC's approval of a "soft money" advertisement by
the Republican National Committee that discussed issues but also crit-
icized President Clinton by name, fueled the practice of issue advertis-
ing and caused both major parties to undertake multi-million dollar
issue advertising campaigns during the 1996 election cycle.75 A rap-
idly growing economy in the 1990s created an ample supply of well-
heeled individuals and corporations that, unable to make hard money
contributions, were eager to contribute "soft money" that the political
parties accepted with alacrity.76
2. The Rise of Section 527 Groups and the Temporary
Resurgence of Hard Money
The extensive use of "soft money" and some questionable practices
during the 2000 presidential election prompted Senators John McCain
of Arizona and Russell Feingold of Wisconsin to champion the Mc-
72. The Colorado Republican Party ran radio ads in opposition to its likely opponent in an
upcoming race for the U.S. Senate at a time in which the maximum amount allowed by law had
already been expended by the party. The Court determined that the expenditures in question
were independent and not subject to spending restrictions. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. FEC (Colorado 1), 518 U.S. 604, 614-15, 618, 622-23 (1996). A later case, Colorado
II, upheld restrictions on coordinated expenditures by political parties. See supra note 69; see
also Briffault, supra note 70, at 627-28.
73. Briffault, supra note 70, at 629 (citing to FEC Advisory Opinion 1978-10 (1978) and FEC
Advisory Opinion 1979-17 (1979)).
74. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
75. Briffault, supra note 70, at 632 (citing to FEC Advisory Opinion 1995-25 (1995)).
76. Id. at 631.
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Cain-Feingold Act.77 Title I of the legislation took direct aim at "soft
money" by prohibiting national committees of political parties from
soliciting, receiving, directing another to contribute funds or anything
of value, or spending any funds that were not subject to the hard
money statutory restrictions and reporting requirements.78 State, dis-
trict, and local party committees are similarly restricted with respect
to amounts that such committees expend for federal election
activities.79
Title II of the statute restricted coordinated expenditures by prohib-
iting political parties from engaging in electioneering communications,
a term defined as any:
[B]roadcast, cable, or satellite communication which[:] (I) refers to
a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is made
within[:] (aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for
the office sought by the candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary
or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party
that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by
the candidate; and (III) in the case of a communication which refers
to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President,
is targeted to the relevant electorate.80
77. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform (McCain-Feingold Act) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i (2002)). See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Gore's Calls to
Big Donors Number 86, Papers Show, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 1997, at A26 (reporting that Vice
President Gore made fundraising calls from the White House); Don Van Natta, Jr. & Jill Abram-
son, In Justice Inquiry, Clinton Denies Seeking Financial Help for Friend, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25,
2000, at Al (reporting on the allegations that a large campaign contribution was pledged to
President Clinton by an Indonesian businessman).
78. McCain-Feingold Act § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i). Title I of the
Act also increased the limitation on contributions to state political committees to $10,000 and
required enhanced disclosures from political committees. Id. §§ 102-103, 116 Stat. at 86-88
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441i(a)(1), 434). The Republican National Committee challenged the
restrictions on soft money donations to political parties, but the district court upheld the ban in a
decision that was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court. See Republican Nat'l Comm.
v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010), aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
79. McCain-Feingold Act § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i). State and
local committees of a political party were permitted to receive "Levin Funds," which are dona-
tions up to $10,000 per year per donor that the committee may use for certain purposes such as
voter registration drives, voter identification initiatives, and get-out-the-vote efforts. Id.
§ 101(a), 116 Stat. at 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)).
80. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434). A communication is targeted at the
relevant electorate if it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in the congressional district or
state of a candidate for the House of Representatives or Senate, respectively. Id. § 201, 116 Stat.
at 90 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434). If a communication is an "electioneering communications,"
then it subjects any person who disbursed funds in excess of $10,000 during any calendar year to
detailed reporting requirements. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 88-89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434). News
stories, commentaries, editorials distributed through the facilities of a broadcast station not
owned or controlled by a political party, candidate, or political committee, candidate debates or
forums, or communication promoting such events are not considered "electioneering communi-
cations." Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434).
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Using the "magic words" is not required in order for a communication
to fit within this definition, and, in the event that the statutory defini-
tion is held unconstitutional, the statute provides that the term in-
cludes only express advocacy communications that are "suggestive of
no plausible meaning other than exhortation to vote for or against a
specific candidate."81 Corporations and labor unions were prohibited
from making electioneering communications.82
Title III of the McCain-Feingold Act increased the contribution lim-
itation for contributions to candidates from $1000 to $2000 and in-
creased the limitation for contributions to national party committees
from $20,000 to $25,000.83 Congressional concern that the ban on soft
money would accentuate the inherent advantage enjoyed by wealthy
81. McCain-Feingold Act § 201, 116 Stat. at 89.
82. Id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)). Certain non-profit corpora-
tions and I.R.C. § 527 organizations are excluded from the prohibition under the so-called
Snowe-Jeffords amendment, provided that the communication in question is paid for exclusively
by funds provided directly by individuals who are citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of
the United States. Id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(2)). With respect to
civic associations that receive corporate or union funding, the exemption only applies if the com-
munication is paid for out of a segregated account to which only the above described individuals
can contribute. Id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 91-92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(3)(B)). The Snowe-
Jeffords amendment codified, to an extent, the extension of the "MCFL" corporation exception
to "electioneering communications." In FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986), the ban on corporate political expenditures for express advocacy, as applied to a small,
non-profit corporation, was challenged. Although the corporation could have established a PAC
to make the expenditures in question, the Court believed that the administrative burdens of
operating a PAC would be impractical for many small organizations. Id. at 254-55. The Court
held that the prohibition on corporate expenditures, as applied to this corporation, was unconsti-
tutional. The FEC subsequently amended its regulations to provide an exception for so-called
"MCFL" corporations-corporations that were formed to promote political ideas, have no
shareholders or other persons with a claim to corporate assets or earnings, and were not estab-
lished by, nor accepted contributions from, labor unions or business corporations. See Express
Advocacy; Independent Expenditures; Corporate and Labor Organization Expenditures, 60 Fed.
Reg. 35292 (July 6, 1995) (codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 106, 109, 114). The provision in ques-
tion was codified at 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c).
83. McCain-Feingold Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81, 102 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1)). The Act set the aggregate contribution limitation at $37,500 for contributions to
candidates and their authorized committees and at $57,500 for all other contributions, provided
no more than $37,500 in contributions were made to political committees other than national
party committees. Id. § 307,116 Stat. at 102-03 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)). These contri-
bution limitations are indexed for inflation. Id. § 307, 116 Stat. at 103 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(c)). The individual contribution limits for 2013-14 are $2600 and $32,400 for contribu-
tions to candidates and national party committees, respectively. The aggregate limitations for
the same period are $48,600 for contributions to candidates and $74,600 for contributions to
political parties and PACs for an overall biennial limitation of $123,200. See The FEC and Fed-
eral Campaign Finance Law, FED. ELECTION COMM'N (Feb. 2004, last updated Jan. 2013), http://
www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#Contribution Limits. Recently, a federal district
court upheld the constitutionality of the aggregate contribution limitations. See McCutcheon v.
FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012). The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction.
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013).
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candidates led to the inclusion of a very controversial provision in Ti-
tle III: the so-called millionaires' amendment. Buckley precluded re-
strictions on a candidate's use of personal or family funds in financing
her campaign. 84 To mitigate the advantages provided by personal
wealth, the millionaires' amendment, a complex provision supported
by detailed disclosure rules, increased the contribution limits for do-
nations to a candidate based on the level of self-funding by the candi-
date's opponent.85 The Court invalidated this provision in 2008
because it imposed an "unprecedented penalty on any candidate who
robustly exercises that First Amendment right."86
Less than two years after its passage, the McCain-Feingold Act was
before the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC. 7^ A bitterly divided
Court upheld the Act virtually in its entirety, including the Act's re-
strictions on "soft money."88 The Court upheld the corporate and
union ban on electioneering communications, finding that the statu-
tory definition of such communications was "both easily understood
and objectively determinable." 89 Moreover, the Court rejected the
notion that the use of Buckley's "magic words" was a constitutional
requirement in order for communication restrictions to pass First
Amendment scrutiny and, in fact, expanded the definition of express
advocacy when it concluded that "issue ads broadcast during the
[thirty] and [sixty] day periods preceding federal primary and general
elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy."90
84. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
85. See generally McCain-Feingold Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 304, 116 Stat. 81, 97 (codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(i)).
86. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738-39 (2008). According to the Court, the "millionaires'
amendment" ran counter to the anticorruption rationale approved in Buckley because its rem-
edy for excessive campaign money was the very form of financing that has the potential for quid
pro quo corruption-more direct campaign contributions to the opposing candidate. Id. at 743.
The constitutionality of the "millionaires' amendment" was not decided in McConnell. See Mc-
Connell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). Senator Mitch McConnell, the lead plaintiff, did not chal-
lenge this provision. It was challenged by a group of other plaintiffs, but the Court dismissed
their challenge for lack of standing. See id. at 94.
87. Titles IV and V of the Act provided for the direct appeal, on an expedited basis, to the
Supreme Court of any district court decision concerning declarative or injunctive relief from the
Act on constitutional grounds, gave standing to members of Congress, and mandated that re-
ports be made accessible on the internet. McCain-Feingold Act §§ 403, 501-502, 116 Stat. at
113-15 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 437h, 434(a)(11)(B), 438a).
88. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer formed the majority. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy all dissented from significant portions
of the majority opinion. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
89. Id. at 194. The Court did interpret the statute to retain the "MCFL" corporation excep-
tion despite statutory language, which on its face appeared to negate the "MCFL" corporation
exception for television, radio, cable, and satellite television communications. Id. at 211. See
supra note 82 for a discussion of the "MCFL" corporation exception.
90. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
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Justice Scalia issued a scathing dissent that foretold the future judi-
cial hostility toward McConnell:
This is a sad day for freedom of speech. Who could have imagined
that the same Court which, within the past four years, has sternly
disapproved of restrictions upon such inconsequential forms of ex-
pression as virtual child pornography, tobacco advertising, dissemi-
nation of illegally intercepted communications, and sexually explicit
cable programming, would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to
the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect: the
right to criticize the government. 91
In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., the Court reexamined the
ban on corporate electioneering communications and cited New York
Times v. Sullivan's admonition that the "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open." 92 According to the
Court, an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if
such "ad is susceptible [to] no reasonable interpretation other than as
an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." 93 The Court
placed significant emphasis on the fact that the ad in question did not
mention an election, candidate, party, or challenger. 94
The McCain-Feingold Act's prohibition on the use of "soft money"
by political parties resulted in the increased prominence of section 527
organizations. These organizations include parties, committees, as-
sociations, funds, or other incorporated or unincorporated organiza-
tions that are organized and operated for the purpose of accepting
contributions and making expenditures to influence, or attempt to in-
fluence, the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any in-
dividual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office in a
91. Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
92. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 467-68 (2007) (citing New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., a non-profit advocacy corpora-
tion, desired to run advertisements within thirty days of the 2004 Wisconsin primary that would
mention Senator Feingold by name. The ads criticized the filibusters by Senate Democrats of
certain judicial nominees of President Bush. The ads would contain none of the so-called "magic
words" of express advocacy. The corporation sought declarative and injunctive relief but such
relief was denied because, according to the district court, McConnell precluded an "as applied"
challenge to the statute. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1260, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29036, at *6 (D.D.C. 2004). The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded the case
to the district court, which then sustained the challenge. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546
U.S. 410 (2006) (per curiam); Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006).
93. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 470.
94. Id. Regulations were issued in the aftermath of this decision that freed corporations and
labor unions that make electioneering communications from reporting the identities of their
donors unless such donations were made for furthering such communications. As a result, non-
earmarked contributions to such organizations were not required to be disclosed. See 11 C.F.R.
§ 104.20(c)(9) (2011). See also Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72911 (explaining
the justification for the FEC's position).
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political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presiden-
tial electors. 95
Section 527 governs the taxation of political organizations, and, due
to its expansive view of activities permissible by such organizations,
not all of these organizations are subject to the campaign finance
laws. 9 6 Many activities of these organizations do not amount to ex-
press advocacy and, accordingly, are outside the scope of the cam-
paign finance rules.97 After Buckley, only political organizations that
engage in express advocacy or that coordinate their activities with a
candidate, candidate's committee, or political party are subject to reg-
ulation by the FEC.98 However, all section 527 organizations are sub-ject to disclosure requirements similar to those required under the
campaign finance rules, that are administered by the IRS.99
The McCain-Feingold Act's "soft money" ban increased the relative
importance of unregulated issue advocacy by 527 organizations. 100
Democrats took to section 527 organizations more quickly than
Republicans, but by the time of the 2004 presidential campaign sea-
son, Republicans had eagerly embraced these organizations.101 Ap-
proximately $233 million was raised by section 527 organizations for
federal election activities in 2004, most of which was related to the
presidential election. 102 However, by 2008, both political parties
95. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (CCH 2013).
96. In general, political organizations are subject to tax on their taxable income at corporate
income tax rates. I.R.C. § 527(b) (CCH 2013). However, excluded from taxable income is "ex-
empt function income," which includes contributions, membership dues and fees, fundraising
proceeds, and certain other sources of income. I.R.C. § 527(c)(3) (CCH 2013). Costs incurred
to aid a person in exploring whether to run for office, costs related to issue advocacy, and costs
incurred between elections and prior to the existence of a named candidate are examples of
exempt function expenditures that would not be governed under the campaign finance rules. See
generally Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for Campaign
Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 1190-93 (2007).
97. The tax law "encompasses activities that, directly or indirectly, relate to and support any
aspect of the process of influencing or attempting to influence" the electoral process. Id. at 1192
(emphasis in original).
98. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. The McCain-Feingold Act subjected politi-
cal organizations that engage in "electioneering communications" to FEC regulation. See supra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
99. I.R.C. § 527(j) (CCH 2013).
100. In contrast to political parties, these organizations were funded primarily by large contri-
butions from individuals. See Meredith A. Johnston, Note, Stopping "Winks and Nods": Limits
on Coordination as a Means of Regulating 527 Organizations, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1166, 1180-81
(2006).
101. Id. at 1182-83.
102. Id. Two commentators estimated that spending by section 527 organizations during the
2004 presidential election was in excess of $440 million. See Ellen L. Weintraub & Jason K.
Levine, Campaign Finance and the 2008 Elections: How Small Change(s) Can Really Add Up, 24
ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 461, 467 (2009) (citing to figures provided by OpenSecrets.org).
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placed increased emphasis on "hard money" fundraising, in part due
to the McCain-Feingold Act's increased contribution limitations that
were exploited effectively through the use of bundlers and, in part,
due to the FEC's aggressive use of case by case challenges to the prac-
tices of several section 527 groups.103 Howard Dean's success in utiliz-
ing the internet as a tool for raising small donations resulted in the
growth of internet-based "hard money" fundraising. 104
Thus, for over thirty years Buckley defined the scope of permissible
campaign finance regulation. The distinctions between contributions
and expenditures, on the one hand, and express advocacy and other
forms of communication, on the other hand, were critical to the gov-
ernment's regulatory efforts. However, campaign practices were
about to undergo a sea of change as a result of the Court's landmark
decision in Citizens United, a change that ushered in the era of Super
PACs and politically active social welfare organizations.
3. Citizens United, Super PACs, and Section
501(c)(4) Organizations
Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, released a documentary
film that mentioned then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate in the
Democratic Party's presidential primary elections, by name and that
was extremely critical of her.105 The film was released in theaters, on
DVD, and a cable operator offered to make the film available to its
subscribers free of charge on its video on demand service.106 Citizens
United received a small portion of its funding from for-profit
corporations. 107
103. Id. at 467-68 (noting that, after the 2004 elections, the FEC imposed over $3 million in
fines against a number of section 527 organizations). Bundlers are individuals who are identified
with the campaign that collect individual donations. During the 2008 presidential campaign,
Senator Obama raised $750 million from 605 bundlers, and Senator McCain raised $375.5 mil-
lion from 851 bundlers. See Laura MacCleery, Goodbye Soft Money, Hello Grassroots: How
Campaign Finance Reform Restructured Campaigns and the Political World, 58 CATH. U. L.
REV. 965, 1003-04 (2009) (citing to the results of an investigation by Public Citizen).
104. See id. at 970, 994-99. See also Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.com: How the
FEC's Failure to Fully Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1708, 1708 n.3 (2009). The Republican Party has experienced internal divisions over the
revamping of its digital platforms for targeting voters and donors. See Neil King, Jr., GOP Taps
Tech Allies To Narrow Digital Gap, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2013, 7:46 PM).
105. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319-20 (2010). The film, HILLARY: THE MOVIE
(Citizens United 2008), may have a second run. In anticipation of a presidential run in 2016 by
Hillary Clinton, Citizens United showed the movie at the annual gathering of the Conservative
Political Action Committee in March 2013. See Jim Rutenberg, A Clinton in 'Transition' Keeps
Opponents and Donors Frozen, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 30, 2013).
106. Citizens United, 558 U.S at 319-20. Citizens United also prepared three ads that it in-
tended to run on broadcast and cable television to promote the film. Id.
107. Id.
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Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
FEC because it was concerned that the film's availability by video on
demand within thirty days of the 2008 primary elections would cause
the organization to run afoul of the McCain-Feingold Act's ban on
corporate electioneering communications. It asserted that the ban on
electioneering communication was unconstitutional as applied to the
film and that the disclaimer and disclosure requirements of the Mc-
Cain-Feingold Act were unconstitutional as applied to the film and its
related advertisements. 08
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, rejected all four "as applied" claims
made by Citizens United.'09 Citizens United claimed that the ban on
electioneering communication was inapplicable to the film because
the film did not qualify as an electioneering communication under the
statute because video-on-demand transmissions, delivered only to a
requesting cable converter box, could be viewed by only one house-
hold, thereby falling far short of the statutorily required 50,000 person
potential audience."i 0 The Court rejected this argument, noting that
FEC regulations clearly provided that the number of people who can
receive a cable transmission is to be determined by the number of
cable subscribers in the relevant area, in this case 34.5 million."'
Citizens United also asserted that the ban on electioneering com-
munication could not be applied to the film because the film was not
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.112 In Wisconsin Right
to Life, the Court held that the functional equivalent of express advo-
108. Id. at 321. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
statutory provision in question. The Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure provisions of the
legislation. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-72.
109. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice
Alito, concurred and wrote separately to discuss the issue of stare decisis. Id. at 372 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito and by Justice Thomas in part, concurred
and wrote separately to address corporate First Amendment rights. See id. at 385 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in all of the majority opinion
except the part of the opinion that upheld the legislation's disclaimer and disclosure require-
ments. Justice Thomas believed that those requirements are also unconstitutional. See id. at 480
(Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, dissented to all of the majority opinion except the portion of the
opinion that upheld the statute's disclaimer and disclosure requirements. See id. at 393 (Stevens,
J. dissenting in part, concurring in part).
110. In the alternative, the corporation argued that the 50,000-person requirement should be
measured by the plausible number of registered voters likely to view the transmission. Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 323-24. The Court rejected this argument on the grounds that such a statu-
tory interpretation would not cure the constitutional defect because it would subject the speaker
to sanctions as a result of inaccurate estimates and also cause such speaker to incur burdensome
expenses in challenging such estimates. Id. at 324.
111. Id. at 323.
112. Id. at 324.
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cacy was a communication that "is susceptible of no reasonable inter-
pretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate." 113 The Court found that the film was susceptible to no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote against Sen-
ator Clinton.114 Citizens United further contended that the corporate
ban on electioneering communications should be held invalid as ap-
plied to films distributed by video-on-demand services because video
on demand requires the viewer to take a series of affirmative steps in
order to view a program. The Court, refusing to be drawn into tech-
nological or media-based line drawing, rejected this argument.115
Finally, Citizens United sought to have the Court create an excep-
tion to the electioneering communication ban that would be applica-
ble to non-profit corporate political speech that is funded
overwhelmingly by donations from individuals. The Court, prior to
the enactment of the McCain-Feingold Act, had created an exception
for corporate advocacy that applied to non-profit corporations that
neither engaged in business activities nor accepted contributions from
for-profit corporations or labor unions: the so-called MCFL excep-
tion.116 In McConnell, the Court interpreted the McCain-Feingold
Act to retain the MCFL exception for electioneering communica-
tions."17 However, the Court held that Citizens United did not qualify
for the exception because this exception prohibited any for-profit cor-
porate funding and Citizens United did receive a modest amount of
such funding."18
The Court then turned its attention to the facial validity of the pro-
vision." 9 The Court termed the provision an "outright ban" on cor-
porate political speech buttressed by criminal sanctions. 120 The Court
emphasized the prominence of political speech in First Amendment
jurisprudence stating that "[t]he First Amendment 'has its fullest and
113. Id. at 324-25 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007)).
114. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 326.
115. Id. at 326-27.
116. See supra note 82.
117. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 211 (2003).
118. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 327. The Court refused to create a de minimis exception to
the "MCFL" exception. Id. at 328-29.
119. Citizens United stipulated to dismissing part of its complaint that challenged the facial
validity of the statute. The Court proceeded with a lengthy discussion that explained why the
waiver of a facial challenge did not preclude the Court from addressing the facial validity of the
statute. See id. at 329-36.
120. Id. at 337. The fact that a corporate sponsored PAC could speak to political issues did
not soften the Court's position because PACs are burdened by administrative responsibilities
and extensive regulatory mandates, which, according to the Court, might explain why there are
fewer than 2000 corporate PACs. Id. at 337-38.
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most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for polit-
ical office.'"121 Accordingly, "[I]aws that burden political speech are
'subject to strict scrutiny,' which requires the [g]overnment to prove
that the restriction 'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest." 122 In perhaps the most controversial
portion of the opinion, the Court rejected the notion that corporations
could be targeted by speech restrictions. The Court opined that re-
strictions aimed at particular speakers are suspect because, in addition
to their effects on the speaker, they also "deprive the public of the
right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers
are worthy of consideration."123
The government asserted three compelling interests in support of
the provision, all of which the Court rejected. 124 First, the govern-
ment asserted the provision was necessary for the prevention of "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corpora-
tion's political ideas."125 The Court unambiguously rejected this inter-
est as adequate to support corporate speech restrictions.126 The
second compelling interest the government asserted in support of the
provision was the prevention of corruption or the appearance of such.
The Court forcefully reaffirmed Buckley's holding that this interest
was limited to the prevention of quid pro quo corruption and stressed
that the distinction drawn in Buckley between restrictions on political
contributions and restrictions on political expenditures was predicated
on this limited view of corruption.127 In 2012, the Court reaffirmed
this position in its short, and rather testy, opinion in American Tradi-
tion Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock.128 Lastly, the Court rejected the gov-
121. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 223 (1989)).
122. Id. at 340 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
123. Id. at 341. Justice Stevens' lengthy dissent disputed, largely on historical grounds, that
corporations are entitled to First Amendment protections similar to those enjoyed by natural
persons. Id. at 424-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). Justice Scalia had a
much different view of the historical record. Id. at 385-93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. The government also asserted a fourth compelling interest: the prevention of foreign
influence in the nation's political process. The Court did not reach this issue because, even if this
interest was found to be compelling, the provision in question would be defective nonetheless
due to its overbreadth in reaching U.S. corporations. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362.
125. Id. at 348 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
126. Id. at 353-56.
127. Id. at 356-61.
128. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). In this case, the Court over-
turned a holding of the Montana Supreme Court, which upheld corporate expenditure restric-
tions, in part due to what the Court perceived as the state's unique history of corporate
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ernment's third asserted compelling interest: protecting dissenting
shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political
speech.129 As a result, the Court invalidated the restrictions on corpo-
rate electioneering communication imposed by the McCain-Feingold
Act and overruled that portion of McConnell that upheld this
provision. 130
Criticism of Citizens United generally has been directed at the
Court's treatment of corporations for First Amendment purposes13 1
However, there are two reasons to believe that the handwringing by
critics of the Court may be overdone. First, the constitutionality of
restrictions on corporate electoral participation was not as clear as
critics of Citizens United believed. Two years after Buckley, the
Court, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, held that a Massa-
chusetts prohibition on contributions and expenditures by certain cor-
porations for the purposes of influencing or affecting the vote on
questions submitted to voters was unconstitutional. 132 Despite the
federal prohibition on corporate contributions dating back to the Till-
participation in electoral corruption. See W. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1,
33 rev'd sub nom. Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012)
129. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361-62. The Court found the statute to be both under and
over-inclusive in meeting this objective. It is under-inclusive because it only restricts certain
forms of political speech and only for a very limited time prior to a primary or general election.
It is over-inclusive because the restrictions apply to all corporations, including those owned by
single shareholders. The Court also believed that any such abuse could be corrected through
traditional corporate governance procedures. Id. at 362.
130. Id. at 365. The disclaimer and disclosure rules were upheld as applied to the film and the
ads promoting the film. Id. at 366-72.
131. The Court's decision prompted President Obama to pointedly express his displeasure
with the Court during his 2010 State of Union address. This portion of President Obama's 2010
State of the Union address can be viewed at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6148956n.
The President was not alone in his displeasure. See Repealing the First Amendment, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 24, 2010, 12:01 AM) (editorializing about a bill to be proposed by Senator Charles Schu-
mer of New York and Representative Chris Van Hollen of Maryland that would restrict corpora-
tions with more than twenty percent foreign shareholders, recipients of TARP funds, and
government contractors from engaging in campaign activity). The bill was introduced in the
Senate on April 30, 2010. See DISCLOSE Act, S. 3295, 111th Cong. (2010). Movement on the
bill stalled in the Senate where Democratic supporters of the bill failed to obtain a filibuster-
proof majority for the bill. See Greg Hitt & Brody Mullins, Campaign-Finance Legislation Dead
for Now, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2010, 12:01 AM). A similar bill introduced in the Senate in 2012
by Senator Whitehouse of Rhode Island met a similar fate. See Disclose Act of 2012, S. 3369,
112th Cong. (2012). Proponents of greater disclosure appear undaunted. On January 3, 2013,
Rep. Van Hollen introduced another bill in the House that is presently in committee. See Dis-
close Act of 2013, H.R. 148, 113th Cong. (2013). Senators Wyden and Murkowski co-sponsored
a bill that was introduced in the Senate on April 23, 2013. The bill contains features similar to
the Disclose Act, but it would also require real time reporting of campaign and independent
group activity and increase the reporting threshold for donations from $200 to $1000. See Follow
the Money Act of 2013, S. 791, 113th Cong. (2013).
132. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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man Act of 1907, the Court focused on the quid pro quo anti-corrup-
tion rationale set forth in Buckley and dismissed rationales based on
shareholder rights and corrupting aggregations of wealth made possi-
ble by the corporate form.133
Several years later, however, the Court, in FEC v. National Right to
Work Committee, noted that restrictions on corporations and labor
unions might be justified to combat the large financial "war chests"
that these entities may amass.134 Less than a decade later in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld the application of
a Michigan law that prohibited the expenditure of corporate funds to
support or oppose any candidate for election to state office to a non-
profit corporation. 135 The Court relied on Buckley's anti-corruption
rationale to justify the restriction and denied that the statute was in-
tended to equalize political voices, a rationale expressly deemed con-
stitutionally inadequate in Buckley and later reaffirmed in Davis.136
In FEC v. Beaumont,'37 the Court had occasion to visit the issue of
whether the ban on direct corporate contributions was unconstitu-
tional as applied to a non-profit advocacy corporation. Despite ex-
isting precedent-the MCFL exception-that provided special
treatment for advocacy corporations with respect to expenditures, the
Court upheld the restrictions pursuant to Buckley's contribution-ex-
penditure dichotomy. 38
In 2007, by which time the composition of the Court had changed
with the retirements of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor
and the additions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, the
Court, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,139 firmly rejected the
position that corporate restrictions could be supported as a means of
rooting out the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form."1 4 0 The Court, in Citizens United, believed that corporations
are entitled to the First Amendment protections enjoyed by other per-
sons and that Austin was aberrational: "Thus the law stood until Aus-
tin. Austin 'uph[eld] a direct restriction on the independent
expenditure of funds for political speech for the first time in [this
133. Id. at 789.
134. FEC v. Nat'I Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1982).
135. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
136. Id. at 660. See also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
137. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
138. Id. at 158-63.
139. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
140. Id. at 479-80 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
2013] 75
76 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:51
Court's] history."141 The Court expressly overruled Austin in Citi-
zens United.142
Second, the belief that Citizens United will result in inordinate cor-
porate electoral influence fails to consider the heterogeneity of corpo-
rate interests. Corporations do not share monolithic interests in
matters of free trade, intellectual property protection, tax policy, en-
ergy policy, and the like. Arguably, corporate political speech, rather
than overwhelm competing voices, will lead to more vigorous debate.
Keep in mind that Citizens United also freed the prototypical corpo-
rate antagonist-labor unions-from political speech restrictions.14 3
Moreover, the fear of corporate participation in electoral politics may
be exaggerated. Corporations tend to keep a low public profile on
contentious political matters. Citizens United may prompt additional
corporate spending on issue advocacy, but it is unlikely to lead to un-
fettered spending in direct support or opposition of a candidate due to
the risk of backing the wrong horse and the concomitant lack of access
that it may cause. In addition, corporations are constrained by the
potential reaction of customers, employees, shareholders, public inter-
est groups, and non-governmental organizations to open advocacy.144
Corporations routinely engage political actors, and, for the most part,
that engagement, through lobbyists, is stealthy.145 Perhaps more
141. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 347 (2010) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 695 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting)).
142. Id. at 365.
143. Apparently, some corporations are not overly concerned about employee reactions to
corporate politicking. See Steven Greenhouse, Here's a Memo From the Boss: Vote This WAY,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012) (reporting that several corporations have provided employees with
information packets that suggest, and occasionally recommend, how employees should vote).
Citizens United may benefit labor unions more than corporations because of the weaker internal
and external restraints imposed on labor unions. See Steven J. Law, Organized Labor and Citi-
zens United, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2010, 7:30 PM). See also Melanie Trottman, Labor Widens Its
Vote Push, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2012, 7:44 PM) (reporting on organized labor efforts to target
nonmembers with its political messages).
144. Public interest groups and non-governmental organizations have played an increasingly
prominent role in corporate governance matters. See, e.g., Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance
as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 452 (2008). See also Wil-
liam McGurn, Op-ed, The Chick-fil-A War is Back On, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2012, at A17
(opining on the controversy that surrounded Chick-fil-A CEO's statements against same-sex
marriage); Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political Contribu-
tions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at A2 (reporting on nationwide demonstrations by gay rights
activists outside Target stores prompted by Target's support for a gubernatorial candidate that
opposed same-sex marriages).
145. Lobbying and the placement of persons sympathetic to corporate points of view in prom-
inent regulatory positions allow such points of view to be made known to decision makers out of
public view. Regulators may not be in a position to fully comprehend the myriad of issues at-
tendant to complex corporate matters. Corporate input may actually mitigate the potential for
policy mistakes due to informational asymmetries. Lobbying activities and lobbyists are subject
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transparent corporate participation in the electoral process is not a
bad thing.
Despite the criticism heaped upon the Court for this portion of its
holding, perhaps the most far-reaching effect of Citizens United was its
refusal to sanction statutory restrictions on independent express advo-
cacy expenditures, corporate or otherwise.146 Thus, the ability to reg-
ulate expenditures was no longer dependent, as it had been since
Buckley and reinforced by Wisconsin Right to Life, on whether ex-
penditures funded either express advocacy or, alternatively, were co-
ordinated. Instead, regulatory power is now dependent upon whether
or not the expenditures in question are independent.
It did not take long for the effects of this holding to alter campaign
practices. On March 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that Citizens United compelled it to strike down the contribu-
tion limitations imposed on donors to an unincorporated section 527
organization that fell under the definition of a political committee.147
The court reasoned that the constitutional protection afforded by Citi-
zens United to independent political expenditures, including express
advocacy expenditures, should naturally extend to contributions to or-
ganizations that make such expenditures. "In light of the Court's
holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not cor-
rupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contribu-
tions to groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot
corrupt or create the appearance of corruption."1 48
Citizens United gave the green light to political committees to ex-
pend unlimited amounts to expressly advocate for a candidate, and
SpeechNow provided the means to fund such expenditures. As a re-
sult, the Super PAC entered the political lexicon. Super PAC is the
colloquial term for a political committee that may receive and spend
unlimited amounts for independent expenditures. 149 However, as a
to widespread regulation. A discussion of such regulations is beyond the scope of this work. See
generally Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2006).
146. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 n.22 (2010).
147. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
148. Id. at 694.
149. An "independent expenditure" is an:
[E]xpenditure by a person-(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the
request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's authorized political committee,
or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.
2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006). The regulations define "expressly advocating" as:
[A]ny communication that-(a) Uses phrases such as "vote for the President," "re-elect
your Congressman," "support the Democratic nominee," "cast your ballot for the Re-
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political committee, a Super PAC is subject to the reporting, disclo-
sure, and recordkeeping requirements of federal campaign law.150
Moreover, although issue advocacy section 527 organizations are not
considered political committees for purposes of the campaign finance
law, they are subject to the tax code's reporting and disclosure re-
quirements.151 Enter the section 501(c)(4) organizations.15 2 These or-
ganizations are a form of tax-exempt organization operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.153 It is not uncommon
publican challenger for U.S. Senate in Georgia," "Smith for Congress," "Bill McKay in
94," "vote Pro-Life" or "vote Pro-Choice" accompanied by a listing of clearly identified
candidates described as Pro-Life or Pro-Choice, "vote against Old Hickory," "defeat"
accompanied by a picture of one or more candidate(s), "reject the incumbent," or com-
munications of campaign slogan(s) or individual word(s), which in context can have no
other reasonable meaning than to urge the election or defeat of one or more clearly
identified candidate(s), such as posters, bumper stickers, advertisements, etc. which say
"Nixon's the One," "Carter '76," "Reagan/Bush" or "Mondale!"; or (b) When taken as
a whole and with limited reference to external events, such as the proximity to the
election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as containing advocacy of
the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s) because-(1) The
electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive
of only one meaning; and (2) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it en-
courages actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly identified candidate(s) or en-
courages some other kind of action.
11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (1995).
150. Political committees that do not operate exclusively to make independent expenditures
often have established "separate segregated funds" or "independent expenditure-only commit-
tees" to make, and raise funds for, independent expenditures. These vehicles have also been
utilized by section 501(c)(4) organizations. See Cynthia L. Bauerly & Eric C. Hallstrom, Square
Pegs: The Challenge for Existing Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Age of the
Super PAC, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIs. & PUB. POL'Y 329, 335-43 (2012). Super PACs were prominent
actors during the 2012 campaign and refined their tactics to target races in which they could
exercise significant influence. See Nicholas Confessore & Jo Craven McGinty, New 'Super
PACs' Alter Landscape for House Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012, at Al. Although often asso-
ciated with the Republican party, the use of Super PACs is a bipartisan phenomenon. See
Nicholas Confessore, 'Super PACs' Finally a Draw for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2012, at
Al.
151. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
152. Social welfare organizations have enjoyed a tax exemption since the passage of the Tariff
Act of 1913, ch.16, § l1(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). The political activities of the non-profit
sector caught the attention of the IRS as early as 1995, and the Wall Street Journal saw fit to
highlight the extent of such political activities in 2007. See U.S. SEN. ENV'T AND PuB. WORKS
COMM., POLITICAL Acriviry OF ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AND THEIR SUPPORTING FOUNDA-
TIONS, 2 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Files.View&FileStore-id=142d595f-411a-4057-b495-029a095fe25f. However, the ability to en-
gage in express advocacy as a result of Citizens United and the ability to finance such express
advocacy as a result of SpeechNow has increased the prominence of such organizations in electo-
ral politics.
153. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (CCH 2013). Political and lobbying activities are also undertaken
by section 501(c)(5) organizations, principally labor unions, and section 501(c)(6) business
leagues, chambers of commerce, and boards of trade. I.R.C. § 501(c)(5)-(6) (CCH 2013). In
fact, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was the most active lobbying organization in 2012. See
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for section 527 Super PACs to be affiliated with section 501(c)(4) so-
cial welfare organizations. For example, President George W. Bush's
former advisor, Karl Rove, was instrumental in the formation of
American Crossroads, a Super PAC, and its affiliated social welfare
organization, Crossroads GPS.154
Section 501(c)(4) organizations are, similar to section 501(c)(3)
charitable organizations and section 527 political organizations, a form
of tax-exempt organization.' 55 There are significant differences
among the organizations, however, with respect to permissible politi-
cal activity and disclosure.156 As discussed above, if a section 527 or-
ganization engages in express advocacy then it is subject to the
disclosure and reporting requirements of federal campaign laws.157 If
such an organization engages in issue advocacy then it is not subject to
federal campaign law requirements, but it is subject to tax law disclo-
sure and reporting requirements.158 Thus, donors to section 527 orga-
Organization Profiles, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.orglorgs/ (last visited Dec. 16,
2013). A well-funded conservative organization with ties to the Koch brothers, Freedom Part-
ners, is a section 501(c)(6) organization. See Nicholas Confessore, Tax Filings Hint at Extent of
Koch Brothers' Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, at A13. The issues raised by these organiza-
tions' political activities are similar to the issues raised by section 501(c)(4) organizations' politi-
cal activity, and the discussion, for the sake of simplicity, is focused on section 501(c)(4)
organizations.
154. See Andrew C. Byrnes & Cortlin H. Lannin, I Went Down to the Crossroads: Lifting the
Blindfold About the Origin of 501 (c) (4) Political Advertisements, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 481, 500-05
(2011).
155. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c), 527 (CCH 2013). Section 501(c)(3) organizations are organizations
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational reasons or to
foster certain amateur sports, prevent cruelty to children or animals, or test for public safety.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (CCH 2013). Other tax-exempt entities include social clubs, domestic frater-
nal societies, benevolent life insurance associations, certain cooperatives, and employee benefit
trusts. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c) (CCH 2013).
156. Contributions to either section 501(c)(4) or section 527 organizations are not tax deducti-
ble. Contributions to section 501(c)(3) organizations, with the exception of those organized to
test for public safety, are deductible. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (CCH 2013). Note that dues or
assessments to certain section 501(c) organizations, such as section 501(c)(4) social welfare orga-
nizations and section 501(c)(6) business leagues, may be deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses pursuant to I.R.C. § 162. Political campaign and lobbying expenditures are
not deductible. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text. A section 501(c) organization
that incurs such expenditures must notify dues-paying members of the portion of dues allocable
to such activities and to that extent the dues are not deductible. Failure to meet these require-
ments will subject the organization to a "proxy tax" imposed at the highest corporate tax rate.
See generally I.R.C. § 6033(e) (CCH 2013).
157. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
158. See I.R.C. § 527(j) (CCH 2013). Failure to make the required disclosures subjects the
political organization to a penalty. See I.R.C. § 527(j)(1) (CCH 2013). Political committees that
are required to report under the federal campaign laws are not subject to the tax disclosure rules.
See I.R.C. § 527(j)(5)(A) (CCH 2013).
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nizations are disclosed under either campaign finance law or the tax
law.159
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from participating or
intervening in any political campaign, but they may engage in lobby-
ing activity if such activities are not a substantial part of the entity's
activities or if such activities are conducted through affiliated section
501(c)(4) organizations.16 0 Thus, these organizations are not signifi-
cant actors in electoral politics-at least not directly.161 In contrast,
159. Section 527 requires political organizations to disclose expenditures of $500 or more and
contributors of $200 or more, and the IRS must make such information publicly available.
I.R.C. §§ 527()(3), 527(k) (CCH 2013).
160. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (CCH 2013); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i)-(iii),
(c)(3)-1(e) (2008); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 n.6 (1983).
Section 501(c)(3) organizations may not, however, form affiliated section 527 political organiza-
tions. See S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 30 (1974). I.R.C. § 501(h) contains an elective provision that
provides safe harbors for lobbying expenditures by certain public charities that, if met, avoid the
loss of tax exempt status. I.R.C. § 501(h) (CCH 2013). However, such electing institutions are
subject to a twenty-five percent tax on excess lobbying expenditures. See I.R.C. § 4911 (CCH
2013). If a section 501(c)(3) organization has lost its tax-exempt status due to its lobbying or
political activities, then it is precluded from converting to a section 501(c)(4) organization.
I.R.C. § 504(a) (CCH 2013).
161. The possibility of forfeiting their tax-exempt status is a significant deterrent to such orga-
nizations although the alacrity with which the IRS enforces the prohibition of political activities
by such organizations is questionable. See Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not
Sowed: Have American Churches Failed to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax Ex-
emption?, 43 CATH. LAw 29, 47 (2004). But see Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (upholding revocation of tax-exempt status). The IRS may also seek injunctive relief
against such organizations in limited circumstances. See I.R.C. § 7409(a)(2) (CCH 2013) (requir-
ing a personal determination by the IRS Commissioner of flagrant abuse). Indirectly, these or-
ganizations may have significant effects on electoral outcomes. For example, religious
organizations' positions on contentious matters, such as abortion or, more recently, mandatory
contraception coverage under employer-provided health insurance, can and do exert influence
over the votes of their constituents. One objective of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), is the provision of preventative care for
women. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (a)(4) (2010). Recommended guidelines were published on Au-
gust 3, 2011 that included, as part of such preventive care, contraceptive services for women,
with discretionary exemptions for certain religious employers. See generally Group Health Plans
and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3, 2011). After originally
providing religious employers with an additional year to comply with the contraception cover-
age, the Obama administration, under pressure from various religious groups, announced a com-
promise whereby insurance companies would provide contraception coverage for employees of
religious employers free of charge if the employers decided not to provide such coverage. See
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Fact Sheet: Women's Preventive
Services and Religious Institutions (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions. This
compromise did not placate the religious groups opposed to the mandate, and legal actions were
brought alleging that the mandate violated the First Amendment. See Rebecca Hall, Comment,
The Women's Health Amendment and Religious Freedom: Finding a Sufficient Compromise, 15 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 401, 403-404 (2012). Final regulations recently were issued that
provide rules similar to the aforementioned compromise. See Treas. Reg. § 54. 9815-2713A
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section 501(c)(4) organizations may engage in unlimited lobbying ac-
tivities that are related to their exempt purpose and may also engage
in political campaigns provided that such activity does not constitute
the organization's primary activity.162 Several section 501(c)(4) orga-
(2013). The Third Circuit held that for-profit secular corporations cannot engage in religious
exercise and, consequently, have neither Free Exercise rights nor rights under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013). The Tenth Circuit, however, held that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Free Exercise Clause do apply to corporations
and that the contraception mandate likely violates the statutory and constitutional rights of the
appellant. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 2013). The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2013 U.S. LEXIS
8418 (Nov. 26, 2013). The political restrictions imposed on these organizations have been subject
to criticism. See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens
United A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 685 (2012); Miriam Galston, When
Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax
Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867 (2011).
162. A section 501(c)(4) organization "is operated exclusively for the promotion of social wel-
fare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of
the people of the community." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1990) (emphasis added).
However, direct or indirect participation in political campaigns are not deemed activities that
promote social welfare. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1990). See also Rev. Rul. 81-95,
1981-1 C.B. 332. Treasury regulations do not provide similar rules with respect to section
501(c)(5) or section 501(c)(6) organizations. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(5)-1(1997), 1.501(c)(6)-
1 (1958). However, the IRS has applied similar principles to these organizations. See IRS Gen.
Counsel Memorandum 34233 (Dec. 3, 1969). See also Marker v. Schultz, 485 F.2d 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). Recently issued proposed regulations applicable to section 501(c)(4) organizations
indicate that specific guidelines for these organizations, similar to those applicable to social wel-
fare organizations, are under consideration. See Preamble to Proposed Treasury Regulations, 78
Fed. Reg. 71535 (Nov. 29, 2013). The regulations have been criticized, and one watchdog organi-
zation has submitted a petition for rulemaking to the IRS. See Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Wash., Petition for Rulemaking on Political Activities by Section 501(c)(4) Organiza-
tions (April 9, 2013), available at http://www.citizensforethics.org/page/-IPDFs/Legal/Letters/
IRS/4_09_13_IRS_RulemakingPetition.pdf?nocdn=1. The IRS has sent questionnaires to sev-
eral section 501(c)(4) organizations in an effort to determine if the extent of such groups' politi-
cal activities jeopardizes their tax-exempt status. See Dan Froomkin, IRS May Make Political
Groups Pay Dearly for Keeping Donors Secret - And Out Them, HUFFINGTON POST (last up-
dated Mar. 9, 2012, 10:00 AM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/irs-political-groups-
501c4-_n_1333389.html. See also infra notes 360-62 and accompanying text. Proposed regula-
tions were issued on November 29, 2013 that would replace the reference to "direct and indirect
participation in political campaigns" to "candidate related political activity," the effect of which
would expand the types of activities that cannot be within the scope of an organization's primary
activities. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii), 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (Nov. 29, 2013). The
term "candidate related political activity" encompasses several activities including certain com-
munications that precede elections, voter registration drives, and donations to several types of
organizations. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(iii), 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (Nov. 29,
2013). The preamble to the proposed rules indicates that the ability of these organizations to
engage in political activity, provided that such activity is not their primary activity, is also under
review. See Preamble to Proposed Treasury Regulations,78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (Nov. 29, 2013).
The distinction between lobbying and election advocacy has been criticized on the grounds that
the election of candidates supportive of an organization's objectives may be the most effective
means of achieving such objectives. Thus, federal election laws often disfavor the most effective
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nizations, such as the AARP and the National Rifle Association
(NRA), are well known for their lobbying prowess and wield consid-
erable political influence.163 However, these organizations are not
subject to expenditure and donor disclosure requirements.164
Unlike section 527 organizations, however, political expenditures
that would be considered part of the exempt function activities of a
section 527 political committee are subject to tax when made by sec-
tion 501(c)(4) organizations.16 5 The tax base for this tax is the lesser
of the organization's net investment income for the taxable year in
which the expenditures are made or the aggregate amount of expendi-
tures for exempt function activities.166 Thus, a section 501(c)(4) or-
ganization with little or no net investment income will not be deterred
in carrying out political activities by the imposition of this tax. In ad-
dition, such organizations may carry out such activities through a sep-
arate segregated fund, which, for tax purposes, is treated as a separate
section 527 organization.16 7
Many section 501(c)(4) organizations spent heavily during the 2010
mid-term election period, including $30 million expended by one or-
ganization, the American Action Network.168 On the eve of the 2012
form of speech. See David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Op-ed, The True Lesson of the IRS
Scandal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2013, at A13.
163. Facebook co-founder Marc Zuckerberg recently announced plans to form a social wel-
fare organization whose objectives will include comprehensive immigration reform and educa-
tion reform. See Evelyn M. Rusli, Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg Starting Political Group, WALL
ST. J. (last updated Mar. 27, 2013, 5:21 PM).
164. See I.R.C. § 6104(d)(3) (CCH 2013) (providing that only private foundations and politi-
cal organizations must disclose donor names and addresses). A section 501(c)(4) organization
must file Form 990 with the IRS and Schedule B of such form requires the identification of
donors who contributed $5000 or more to the organization. However, donor information is not
available for public inspection. See IRS, Schedule B (Form 990, 990-EZ, or 990-PF) (2012) at 5,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdflf990ezb.pdf. The FEC regulation that limited corpo-
rate and labor union disclosure of donor information to only those donors whose donations were
for the specific purpose of funding certain electioneering communications also provides cover to
these organizations. See supra note 94. Representative Christopher Van Hollen unsuccessfully
challenged this regulation. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen, 694 F.3d 108 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) rev'd, Van Hollen v. FEC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2012).
165. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (CCH 2013).
166. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1)-(2) (CCH 2013).
167. I.R.C. § 527(f)(3) (CCH 2013). A separate segregated fund, for this purpose, must either
meet the requirements for such funds under federal campaign finance laws or be formed under a
state statute that permits the segregation of dues for exempt function activities. Id.
168. See Kim Barker, How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elections and Call it Public Welfare,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18, 2012, 11:25 AM) http://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofits-
spend-millions-on-elections-and-call-it-public-welfare; Peter H. Stone, Fine Line Between Polit-
ics and Issues Spending by Secretive 501(c) (4) Groups, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRrrY (last
updated Dec. 1, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/10/31/7205/fine-line-be-
tween-politics-and-issues-spending-secretive-501c4-groups.
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election, one organization that is active in investigating campaign fi-
nance practices estimated that section 501(c)(4) organizations had
spent over $200 million on political advertisements, most of which
were attack ads. Crossroads GPS, the brainchild of Karl Rove, spent
more than $70 million on the 2012 election.169 Democrats recently
have formed a group to counter the activities of Republican-led
groups.170
The increased participation of section 501(c)(4) organizations in
partisan politics raises the question of whether a particular social wel-
fare organization's level of political activity jeopardizes the organiza-
tion's tax-exempt status.171 In addition to the tax issues faced by the
organizations, the IRS also began to focus on a tax issue applicable to
the donors of such organizations, the gift tax. The applicability of the
gift tax to political donations had been unsettled until 1975 when legis-
lation expressly dealt with such donations.172 However, at that time,
such donations invariably were directed to political organizations and
not social welfare organizations, and statutory and judicial guidance
on the applicability of the tax to donations to social welfare organiza-
tions is muddled.
III. GIFT TAX
The gift tax statutes do not define the term "gift" with precision,
and the case law is rather sparse and inconclusive as to whether con-
tributions to social welfare organizations are gifts for purposes of the
gift tax. The statutory language and the regulations provide ample
support for the assertion that such contributions are, in fact, taxable.
Although there are good arguments against reading such taxability
into the statute, equally good counterarguments exist that should en-
able the IRS's position to withstand what likely would be a very defer-
ential standard of review. Moreover, the imposition of the gift tax to
such contributions should withstand First Amendment challenges.
169. Robert Maguire & Viveca Novak, Shadow Money's Top 10 Candidates, OPEN SECRETS
(Oct. 25, 2012, 5:06 PM), http://www.opensetrets.org/news/2012/10/shadow-moneys-top-10-can-
didates.html; Kim Barker, Karl Rove's Dark Money Group Promised IRS it Would Spend 'Lim-
ited' Money on Elections, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 14, 2012, 11:19 AM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/what-karl-roves-dark-money-nonprofit-told-the-irs. For a detailed analysis of the activi-
ties of Crossroads GPS during the 2010 election, see Byrnes & Lannin, supra note 154, at 503-16.
170. Eliza Newlin Carney, Rules of the Game: Obama's Nonprofit Carries on Dubious Tradi-
tion, ROLL CALL (Mar. 10, 2013, 7:30 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/rules-of the
game.obamas.nonprofitcarries on dubious tradition-222978-1.html; Nicholas Confessore,
Obama's Backers Seek Big Donors to Press Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2013, at Al.
171. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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A. In General
A federal gift tax is imposed for each calendar year on the transfer
of property by gift by any individual during such calendar year.173 The
gift tax, introduced by the Revenue Act of 1924, is designed to supple-
ment the federal estate tax. The gift tax's existence and design pre-
vents individuals from avoiding the imposition of a wealth transfer tax
through inter vivos transfers.174 Estate and gift taxes are imposed at
progressive tax rates. In order to maintain such progressivity, the gift
tax base is comprised of all lifetime gifts made through the end of the
taxable year. 75 The tentative tax due is determined only on the
amount of gifts made during the current year, but the tax on such gifts
is determined by the application of higher marginal tax rates because
the previous years' taxable gifts will have absorbed the lower tax rate
brackets.176 A unified credit against the donor's tax liability is pro-
vided. The credit is a statutory amount, adjusted annually for infla-
tion, which is available to offset lifetime gift tax or testamentary estate
tax liability.177 Effective in 2013, the unified credit will shelter tax lia-
bility on cumulative lifetime and testamentary transfers up to
173. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (CCH 2013). The gift tax is imposed on the donor. I.R.C. § 2502(c)
(CCH 2013). Gifts made indirectly by individuals through entities, such as corporations, are
deemed gifts by individuals. See infra notes 310-11 and accompanying text. For gifts that are
made in property, the amount of the gift is determined by the value of the property on the date
of the gift. I.R.C. § 2512(a) (CCH 2013). If property is transferred for less than adequate and
full consideration, then the gift is the excess of the value of property over the amount of such
consideration. I.R.C. § 2512(a)-(b) (CCH 2013). If the spouses so elect, then a gift made by one
spouse is considered as made one-half by each spouse. I.R.C. § 2513(a) (CCH 2013). Gift tax
returns are filed annually on Form 709. See I.R.C. § 6019 (CCH 2013); IRS, Form 709, United
States Gift (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/
Form-709,-United-States-Gift-%28and-Generation-Skipping-Transfer%29-Tax-Return.
174. See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 282, 286 (1933). The constitutionality of wealth
transfer taxes was settled long ago. See Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1875); Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81-82 (1900); see Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 137-38 (1929). The
gift tax was repealed in 1926 but reenacted in 1932 with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1932,
Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 501, 47 Stat. 169, 245 (1932).
175. I.R.C. § 2502(a)(1) (CCH 2013). All taxable gifts made after June 6, 1932 are included in
the lifetime taxable gift amount. I.R.C. § 2502(b) (CCH 2013). The amount of taxable gifts for
preceding taxable years is determined under the law applicable to the period in which such gifts
were made. See I.R.C. § 2504(a)(1) (CCH 2013).
176. I.R.C. § 2502(a)(1)-(2) (CCH 2013).
177. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (CCH 2013). The federal estate tax is coordinated with the gift tax.
A tentative estate tax is imposed on the sum of a decedent's taxable estate and adjusted taxable
gifts made after 1976. The gift tax that would have been imposed on adjusted taxable gifts, had
the gift tax rates and unified credit in the year of death been applicable to those gifts, is then
subtracted from the tentative tax. In effect, the statutory mechanism has the effect of subjecting
all post-1976 transfers, inter vivos and testamentary, to the unified graduated tax rate schedule.
See I.R.C. § 2001 (CCH 2013). A discussion of the estate tax is beyond the scope of this work.
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$5,250,000 and, in certain circumstances for a surviving spouse, a
greater amount that possibly could reach $10,500,000.178
Various transfers are either exempt from the gift tax or are deducti-
ble in arriving at the total of taxable gifts. Transfers of money or
property to section 527 political organizations are not subject to gift
tax.179 This exception was enacted in 1975 and is effective for trans-
fers made after May 7, 1974.180 Several other transfers are not in-
cluded in the taxable gift total for the taxable year. Annual gifts of
$14,000 per donee are not considered gifts made during the taxable
year.'81 Other transfers not deemed gifts include payments on behalf
of another individual to educational institutions or medical providers
178. Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 448 (Jan. 28, 2013). Federal wealth transfer
taxes-gift, estate, and generation skipping transfer taxes-underwent a period of significant
flux beginning with the passage of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-106, 115 Stat. 38 [hereinafter EGTRRA] and ending with the enactment of
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). The latter
legislation was passed just in time to avert the so-called "fiscal cliff." EGTRRA made changes
to the estate and generation skipping transfer tax that, among other changes, would lead to their
repeal in 2010. These taxes faded in 2010 but were revived in 2011 and 2012 with a unified credit
that sheltered $5,000,000 of taxable estates at the end of 2012. The 2013 legislation added some
permanence to transfer taxes. Among the legislation's provisions was the reestablishment of a
unified credit that would shelter $5,000,000 of lifetime gifts and testamentary transfers. I.R.C.
§ 2010(c)(3)(A) (CCH 2013). The unified credit is also adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C.
§ 2010(c)(3)(B) (CCH 2013). Moreover, the unified credit has been made permanently portable
among spouses. I.R.C. § 2010 (CCH 2013). A surviving spouse, absent an election to the con-
trary by the executor of the deceased, automatically succeeds to any unused unified credit of the
deceased spouse. Therefore, an individual could conceivably shelter up to $10,500,000 of asset
transfers from gift and estate tax liability. See I.R.C. § 2010(c)(4) (CCH 2013). For a detailed
analysis of recent legislative changes to the estate tax and their effects on tax planning, see
generally John A. Miller & Jeffrey A. Maine, Wealth Transfer Planning for 2013 and Beyond
(Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2214422; Steve
L. Dellinger & Nathan L. Wadlinger, The Portability Pill: Examining the Trial Stages of Federal
Estate and Gift Tax Spousal Portability, 47 REAL PROP., TR. & EsT. L.J. 367 (2012).
179. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4) (CCH 2013).
180. Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 14, 88 Stat. 2108, 2121 (1975) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 2501(a)(4)).
181. Rev. Proc. 2012-41, 2012-45 I.R.B. 539, 541 (Oct. 18, 2012). The annual exclusion is avail-
able for gifts of a present interest in property-an interest by which the donee has an un-
restricted right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of the property or the income
therefrom. Treas. Reg, § 25.2503-3(b) (1983). The unrestricted right to withdraw amounts trans-
ferred in trust for a temporary period of time will satisfy the present interest requirement. See
Crummey v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). Failure to exercise such power is deemed a
gift to remainder beneficiaries unless the value of the foregone assets does not exceed the
greater of $5000 or five percent of the assets subject to the power. I.R.C. § 2514(e) (CCH 2013).
The annual exclusion is indexed annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(2) (CCH 2013). A gift
made by one spouse to a party other than her spouse is considered made equally by both spouses
provided the spouses consent to such treatment. I.R.C. § 2513(a) (CCH 2013). In effect, this
provision allows married couples to gift $28,000 per donee without gift tax consequences in 2013.
The election by spouses to split gifts requires the filing of a gift tax return if, in the absence of the
election to split gifts, a return would have been necessary. See Treas. Reg. § 25.6019-2 (1994).
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for tuition or medical care, respectively;182 certain loans of artwork to
tax-exempt organizations; 183 transfers pursuant to certain property
settlements incident to divorce; 184 and qualified disclaimers of
property.185
In addition, certain gifts are deductible in arriving at the total taxa-
ble gift figure. Gifts made to or for the use of the United States, any
state or political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia for
exclusively public purposes are deductible. 18 6 Likewise, gifts made to
or for the use of organizations that are organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational pur-
poses, or to foster certain amateur sports competition, encouragement
of art, or prevention of cruelty to children and animals are deducti-
ble. 187 Gifts to these organizations are deductible provided that such
organizations have not lost their tax-exempt status due to their at-
tempts to influence legislation or their participation or intervention in
any political campaign. 88 Gifts to spouses, other than gifts of certain
terminable interests, are also deductible by the donor. 189 Neither an
exemption nor a deduction is provided for gifts made to section
501(c)(4) organizations.
Although the statute fails to define the term "gifts," Treasury regu-
lations define the term expansively. For gift tax purposes, gifts are not
limited to transfers of property made with detached and disinterested
generosity. In fact, donative intent on the part of the transferor is not
an essential element in the application of the tax.190 For example, the
sale or exchange of property for less than the property's fair market
value is deemed a gift.191 Moreover, if the consideration received in a
transaction cannot be reduced to a value in money or money's worth,
such as love or affection, then such consideration is to be wholly disre-
garded and the transaction is considered a gift in its entirety.192 The
182. I.R.C. § 2503(e) (CCH 2013).
183. I.R.C. § 2503(g) (CCH 2013).
184. I.R.C. § 2516 (CCH 2013).
185. I.R.C. § 2518 (CCH 2013).
186. I.R.C. § 2522(a)(1) (CCH 2013).
187. I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2) (CCH 2013). These organizations qualify for tax exempt status under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Gifts to certain organizations operating under the lodge system and gifts to
war veteran organizations also are deductible. See I.R.C. § 2522(a)(3)-(4) (CCH 2013). Special
rules are provided for gifts made by nonresident aliens. See I.R.C. § 2522(b) (CCH 2013).
188. I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2) (CCH 2013).
189. I.R.C. § 2523(f)(1) (CCH 2013).
190. Treas. Reg. § 1.2511-1(g)(1) (1997).
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.2512-8 (1992).
192. Id. See also Wiedemann v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 565 (1956) (holding that payments to sup-
port an adult child were gifts); Rev. Rul. 79-384, 1979-2 C.B. 344 (ruling that a payment in
satisfaction of a promise to graduate from college was a gift).
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Supreme Court has, on several occasions, acknowledged the broad
scope of the statute: "[C]ongress intended to use the term 'gifts' in its
broadest and most comprehensive sense. . . . [t]o hit all the protean
arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are not business
transactions within the meaning of ordinary speech." 193 The Court
has also stated that "absent an express exclusion from its provisions,
any transfer meeting the statutory requirements must be held subject
to the gift tax." 194
However, a sale or exchange, or other transfer of property made in
the ordinary course of business, is deemed to have been made for ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth.195 The regu-
lations state, parenthetically, that the aforementioned exception
applies if the transaction is bona-fide, at arm's length, and free of don-
ative intent. 196 It is not clear whether these three parenthetical re-
quirements are necessary to a determination that a transaction was
made in the ordinary course of business or are both necessary and
sufficient for such a determination. Courts have held that the ordi-
nary course of business exception applies to transactions for which the
transferor lacked donative intent despite the fact that the transaction
in question was not a business transaction in any conventional
sense.197 Transactions motivated by business considerations, as op-
posed to family considerations, have also been held to qualify for the
ordinary course of business exception.198 Moreover, the Tax Court
has, on several occasions, stated that a bona-fide transfer at arm's
length and free of donative intent qualifies for the ordinary business
exception regardless of whether the transaction is a business transac-
tion.199 The IRS, in Revenue Ruling 68-558, similarly found the ex-
193. Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945). See also Wells Fargo Bank N.M., N.A., v.
United States, 319 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2003).
194. Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 334 n.4 (1984). The Court in this case held that the
extension of interest-free loans constituted transfers subject to the gift tax, a result that has since
been codified at I.R.C. § 7872 (CCH 2013).
195. Treas. Reg. § 1.2512-8 (1992).
196. Id.
197. See Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U.S. 106 (1950). See also Rev. Rul. 68-558, 1968-2 C.B. 415
(ruling that the sale of land at a below market price by a group of individuals to a corporation in
order to induce the transferee to operate a manufacturing facility in the community was not a
gift).
198. See, e.g., Beveridge v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 915 (1948); Estate of Anderson v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.
706 (1947); Hull v. Comm'r, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1076 (1962).
199. See Estate of Cullison v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2490 (1998); Estate of Berkman v.
Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979).
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ception to apply if the three parenthetical requirements set forth in
the regulations are met.20 0
B. Application of the Gift Tax to Contributions to Section
501(c) (4) Organizations
1. The Dearth of Case Law
The application of the ordinary course of business exception to con-
tributions to politically active section 501(c)(4) organizations is prob-
lematic, as evidenced by the inconsistency of the courts' holdings with
respect to the application of the gift tax to political contributions. 201
In Stern v. United States, the district court held that political contribu-
tions made by the taxpayer were not gifts because they were bona-
fide, at arm's length, and free from donative intent.202 Accordingly,
the political contributions were made in the ordinary course of busi-
ness and for full and adequate consideration. Critical to the court's
holding was its belief that the taxpayer was neither "motivated by af-
fection, respect, admiration, charity, or like impulses" nor made such
contributions from "detached and disinterested generosity." 2 0 3 In-
stead, in the court's opinion, the taxpayer's contributions were in re-
turn for full and adequate consideration because they were made to
promote efficiency in government and to protect her property inter-
ests.204 The Fifth Circuit, affirming the district court's holding, stated
that:
The transactions in controversy were permeated with commercial
and economic factors. The contributions were motivated by appel-
lee's desire to promote a slate of candidates that would protect and
advance her personal and property interests. To assure that the
funds would be spent in a manner consonant with the attainment of
that goal, appellee and her group retained control over the disburse-
ment of their contributions. In a very real sense, then, Mrs. Stern
was making an economic investment that she believed would have a
direct and favorable effect upon her property holdings and business
interests in New Orleans and Louisiana.205
200. 1968-2 C.B. 415. The IRS, in Stern v. United States, appeared to retreat from the position
it took in Rev. Rul. 68-558 and asserted that political contributions did not qualify for the ordi-
nary course of business exception because such contributions could not be considered business
transactions. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
201. The statutory exclusion for transfers to political organizations was enacted in 1975. See
supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
202. 304 F. Supp. 376, 380 (E.D. La. 1969) aff'd, 436 F.2d 1327(5th Cir. 1971).
203. Id. at 380.
204. Id. at 378-380.
205. Stern v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327, 1330 (1971).
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In Carson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that political contri-
butions made by the petitioners to various candidates for state and
local offices were not gifts. 206 However, the Tax Court's holding went
well beyond Stern's application of the three factor ordinary course of
business exception. The court agreed with the petitioners' contention
that, based on its purpose and history, the gift tax was never intended
to encompass political contributions. 207 The court's holding was based
on several factors. First, according to the court, the nature of political
contributions belies their categorization as gifts. Political contribu-
tions are intended to advance a campaign, not to personally benefit a
candidate.208 Moreover, nothing in the record suggested that the can-
didates to whom the contributions were made were the natural objects
of the donors' bounty.209 Instead, the contributions were made to
"promote the social framework . .. [and] social structure most condu-
cive to his economic aspirations."2 10 According to the court, this case
presented circumstances in which a literal reading of a statute was "at
war with its purpose and history." 211 In the court's opinion, the legis-
lative history of the gift tax's reenactment in 1932 evidenced that Con-
gress contemplated cases that, "despite the literal words of the statute
and considering all the facts and circumstances, were simply transfers
foreign to the purpose of the statute." 212 In a footnote, the court ap-
peared to agree with one commentator's view that the gift tax should
not apply to transactions between strangers of the donor if the donor
is clearly hoping to benefit by the transfer. 213
The court was also influenced by the fact that the IRS waited ap-
proximately thirty-five years from the enactment of the gift tax to de-
clare, in 1959, that campaign contributions were subject to the gift
tax.214 Moreover, the lack of reported cases during this interregnum
206. Carson v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 252 (1978) affd, 641 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981).
207. Id. at 257.
208. Id. at 259.
209. Id. at 257.
210. Id. at 258.
211. Carson, 71 T.C. at 262.
212. Id. at 263.
213. Id. at 263 n.14 (citing to P. Faber, Gift Tax Planning: The New Valuation Tables, Net
Gifts, Political Gifts, and other Problems, 31 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAX'N 1217, 1249 (1973)).
214. Id. at 259. However, Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532 indicates that the IRS articulated
its position, albeit informally, as early as 1956:
In determining the total amount of gifts made during any year by the donor, section
2503 provides an annual exclusion of the first $3000 given to any donee. This means
that a contribution to any person or organization, including a political organization,
may be made each year in the amount of $3000 or less without any requirement that
the amount be reported for gift tax purposes. In determining the amount permitted as
an exclusion in the case of a contribution made to a political organization, only one
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demonstrated that the IRS was not enforcing the tax against donors to
political campaigns.215 Finally, the purpose of the gift tax-as a back-
stop or supplement to the estate tax-is not served by taxing political
contributions because such contributions typically are not made by
testamentary disposition.216 Accordingly, political contributions "are
simply not 'gifts' within the meaning of the gift tax law."217
In contrast, the federal district court, in Du Pont v. United States,
held that a contribution to a New York corporation formed to "pre-
serve private enterprise, private property and private initiative and
American independence" was taxable for gift tax purposes.218 The
taxpayer had included the contribution on his gift tax return but had
taken a corresponding deduction for the contribution as a gift for
charitable and public purposes. 219 The IRS disallowed the deduction
upon audit and the taxpayer filed a claim for refund, asserting that the
contribution was not a gift at all but, instead, was a payment to the
corporation for services to be rendered by experts in monetary, busi-
ness, and political conditions in the United States and elsewhere.220
The court disagreed with the taxpayer's categorization of the payment
and emphasized that the consideration claimed by the taxpayer in ex-
change for the payment was not reducible to money's worth.221 More-
over, the taxpayer's contention was belied by the fact that any benefit
derived from the payment was enjoyed not only by the taxpayer but
also by every citizen in the country. 222 The court analogized the tax-
payer's contribution to the transfer of funds to a political party that
shared his economic views or to a journal that shaped public
opinion.223
The Tax Court, in Estate of Blaine v. Commissioner, held that con-
tributions to a social welfare organization that promoted world gov-
ernment were not deductible for gift tax purposes because the
$3000 exclusion is permitted, even though the personal campaigns of several individuals
may be benefited by the contribution made to such organization.
Id.
215. Carson, 71 T.C. at 260.
216. Id. at 260-62.
217. Id. at 264.
218. Du Pont v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 944, 946-47 (D. Del. 1951).
219. Id. at 945.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 946-47.
222. Id. at 947.
223. Du Pont, 97 F. Supp at 947. The Tax Court, in Carson, noted this statement but distin-
guished this case from Du Pont on the grounds that Du Pont did not concern the applicability of
the gift tax to political contributions. See Carson v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 252, 260 n.9 (1978).
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organization did not qualify as an educational institution.224 The tax-
payer had included the contributions as gifts on a tax return but then
deducted such contributions. The court did not discuss the issue of
whether the taxpayer's contributions were gifts but instead focused
solely on whether the status of the recipient organization qualified the
taxpayer's contribution for the deduction. 225 Interestingly, the court
made clear that the taxpayer, the sole benefactor of the organization,
had more than an academic or educational interest in the institution of
a world government.226 However, the court did not reach the issue of
whether such an interest called into question the nature of the contri-
butions as gifts.
Du Pont and Blaine, unlike Stern and Carson, dealt directly with
issue advocacy and not contributions to political parties or candidates
for public office. In 1959, the IRS formally took the position that con-
tributions to political parties or candidates in excess of the annual ex-
clusion amount were subject to the gift tax.2 27 The IRS later
reiterated its position when it announced that it would follow Stern
only in the Fifth Circuit and that contributions to political parties can-
not be treated as made to various candidates for purposes of applying
the gift tax annual exclusion. 228 However, in 1982, the IRS stated that
it would no longer contend that contributions made to political orga-
nizations described in section 527 prior to May 8, 1974 were subject to
gift tax.229 This pronouncement represented a reversal of the IRS's
position that the enactment of the gift tax exclusion for contributions
to section 527 political organizations amounted to a change in the
law. 23 0 However, the IRS made clear that it continues to maintain
that gratuitous transfers to organizations not described in section 527
are subject to gift tax regardless of whether such contributions are
motivated to advance the donor's social, political, or charitable objec-
tives. 231 At least one taxpayer was concerned enough that the gift tax
could apply to donations to section 501(c)(4) organizations to request
a ruling from the IRS that contributions to a segregated fund of a
224. Estate of Blaine v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 1195, 1212, 1214 (1954).
225. Id. at 1210-11.
226. Id. at 1212-13.
227. Rev. Rul. 59-57, 1959-1 C.B. 626.
228. Rev. Rul. 72-583, 1972-2 C.B. 534; Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532.
229. Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220.
230. This contention was rejected by the Tenth Circuit in Carson. According to the court, the
enactment of the statutory exception could also be interpreted as Congress making explicit that
which had been historically implied. Carson v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 864, 866 (1981).
231. Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220.
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section 501(c)(4) organization would qualify as a contribution to a sec-
tion 527 organization and, thus, avoid any gift tax issues.232
2. Statutory Support for Taxability
Although whether contributions to section 501(c)(4) organizations
are subject to gift tax is not free from doubt, statutory support exists
for the position that such contributions are, in fact, taxable. Moreo-
ver, the regulatory requirement that consideration not reducible to
money's worth is to be ignored in determining whether a transfer is a
gift should be able to withstand Chevron deference. 233 Admittedly,
plausible arguments exist for the proposition that such transfers are
not gifts. However, each of these arguments has its weaknesses.
Section 2501(a)(1) imposes a tax on transfers of property by gift,
and, absent a statutory exclusion or deduction, any transfer by gift is
subject to tax. Section 2511 clarifies that the tax imposed by section
2501 shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether
the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or per-
sonal, tangible or intangible. 234 Congress provided a specific exclu-
sion for donations to political organizations, as defined in section
527.235 Moreover, Congress provided a deduction for gifts to most
section 501(c)(3) organizations and several other types of organiza-
tions.236 Congress' silence with respect to donations to section
501(c)(4) organizations, in combination with its special treatment of
contributions to section 527, section 501(c)(3), and certain other orga-
nizations, can be interpreted, under the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, to subject donations to section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions to tax.237
Of course, a transfer must first be a gift for the statute to apply
regardless of the type of organization to which the transfer is made.
The statute does not define the term "gift," but the regulations make
clear that a transfer, the consideration for which is not reducible to
232. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996). See supra note 167 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the statutory authority of section 501(c)(4) organizations to maintain
segregated funds that are treated, for tax purposes, as section 527 organizations.
233. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
234. I.R.C. § 2511(a) (CCH 2013).
235. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4) (CCH 2013). See also supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
236. I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2)-(4) (CCH 2013).
237. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a maxim of statutory interpretation that means that
the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed.
1979). See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (supporting preemption
of state law on "a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius: Con-
gress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters
beyond that reach are not pre-empted.").
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money or money's worth, is a gift.23 8 Under Chevron, if a statute does
not directly address the precise question at issue then a very deferen-
tial standard of review is applied to agency action that had been sub-
ject to notice and comment.239 Under that standard, agency action
will not be disturbed unless it is found to be arbitrary, capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.240 The rationale for
judicial deference to agency action was set forth by Justice Ginsburg
in a very recent case, American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecti-
cut.241 "The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than
individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.
Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological re-
sources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order." 242
A less deferential test-the so called National Muffler test-was ap-
plied by the Court prior to Chevron. Under that test, the courts ex-
amined several factors, including whether the regulation in question
was a contemporaneous construction of the statute, the length of time
that the regulation was in effect, the degree of reliance placed on the
regulations by affected parties, and the consistency of the agency's po-
sition.243 The Court continued to apply the National Muffler test to
Treasury regulations issued under the general statutory grant of au-
thority under I.R.C. section 7805 and limited Chevron deference to
Treasury regulations issued under a specific statutory grant of
authority.244
238. Treas. Reg. § 1.2512-8 (1992). See also supra note 192 and accompanying text.
239. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
240. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 277 (2001).
241. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). The issue in this case was
whether several states, the City of New York, and three private parties could maintain federal
common law nuisance claims against various private power companies and the Tennessee Valley
Authority for carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions. The Court held that the
Clean Water Act and actions by the Environmental Protection Agency preempted those claims.
Id. at 2532.
242. Id. at 2539-40.
243. Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16,24 (1982); Rowan Cos., Inc. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981). Several recent cases involving a statutory provision that
provides relief to innocent spouses for deficiencies attributable to tax understatements in a joint
income tax return illustrate the difficulty for taxpayers in overcoming Chevron deference. I.R.C.
§ 6015 contains three provisions that provide relief to innocent spouses with respect to income
tax deficiencies, penalties, and interest arising from the filing of a joint income tax return. Two
provisions require that the statutory relief be sought within two years of the institution of collec-
tion activities. I.R.C. §§ 6015(b)(1)(E), (c)(3)(B) (CCH 2013). The third provision applies if
neither of the first two provisions is applicable and, under all the facts and circumstances, it
would be inequitable to hold the spouse liable for all or a portion of the deficiency at issue.
I.R.C. § 6015(f) (CCH 2013). Although this provision does not contain a two-year limitation
period, the regulations apply a two-year period in which taxpayers must seek relief. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6015-5(b)(1) (2002). This regulation has been challenged and upheld by the Third, Fourth,
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It is arguable that a lesser standard of deference is justified for tax
regulations due to the inherent advantages enjoyed by the IRS over
taxpayers. 245 However, in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education &
Research v. United States, the Court did away with the distinction be-
tween these two types of Treasury regulations, acknowledging that the
changes in the administrative landscape over the years no longer justi-
fied special rules for tax regulations.246 Accordingly, tax regulations,
regardless of their source of authority, are entitled to Chevron
deference. 247
The regulations' categorical refusal to consider consideration that is
not reducible to money or money's worth in determining whether a
transfer is a gift appears to be a plausible method of interpreting the
term "gift." After all, many, if not most, transfers to charitable and
educational organizations, what many would consider as the prototyp-
ical transfers motivated by detached and disinterest generosity, return
psychic benefits to their donors not unlike the benefits derived from
political contributions. For example, it is difficult to discern a princi-
pled distinction between the benefits derived from a donation that
may aid in advancing a political position favored by the donor and the
benefit derived by a donor from a donation to an educational institu-
tion that advances the donor's strongly held views about educational
policies. One could insert a charitable organization into the facts in
Carson and reach the same conclusion as the Tax Court did in that
and Seventh Circuits. See Mannella v. Comm'r, 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011); Jones v. Comm'r,
642 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2011); Lantz v. Comm'r, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010). In Jones, the Fourth
Circuit applied Chevron-type deference and reasoned that it was plausible that Congress' failure
to provide for a two-year limitation period evidenced an intention to leave the matter to the
discretion of the IRS. Despite its victories in court, the IRS has announced that it will no longer
require that relief under the third provision be sought within the two-year period specified in the
regulations. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-70, 2011-2 C.B. 135.
245. See Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Defer-
ence, 57 THE TAX LAw. 717, 723-24 (2004).
246. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713-14 (2011).
247. Id. at 714. Informal agency guidance, however, is not entitled to Chevron deference. In
United States v. Mead, the Court applied a much less deferential standard of review to a customs
service ruling and stated explicitly that this standard of review-the Skidmore standard-sur-
vived Chevron. United States v. Mead, Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 225, 235 (2001). Under Skidmore,
the weight that a court will give an agency action depends upon the thoroughness of the agency's
deliberations, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and other factors that provide the agency with the power to persuade. See Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). It is debatable whether Skidmore provides for any deference at
all. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a detailed analysis of deference in the
tax context as it existed prior to Mayo Foundation, see Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax
Regulations: A Reconsideration in Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Devel-
opments, 61 THE TAx LAw. 481 (2008); Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 245.
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case. 248 The fact that Congress saw the need to provide a specific de-
duction for contributions to certain charitable and educational institu-
tions indicates that the receipt of psychic benefits was not adequate
consideration for a transfer to avoid gift status.
This is not to suggest that the regulations' interpretation is the only
plausible interpretation of the term "gift." Arguably, political contri-
butions may be aligned more closely with the donor's business and
property interests than donations to section 501(c)(3) organizations,
although this distinction may not hold for donations to charities that
work with subject matters related to a donor's business. The Stern
court emphasized the connection of the donation to the donor's prop-
erty interests, but the Carson court did not premise its holding on any
business connection to the donation.249 In any event, these two cases
are old and hardly settle the matter. Moreover, there are several ar-
guments for exempting contributions to section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions from the gift tax. However, none of these arguments are
particularly satisfying nor strong enough to overcome Chevron
deference.
First, the codification of an exception for donations to political or-
ganizations can be interpreted as Congress making explicit what had
already been implied and not as a change in the law. The limitation of
the statutory exclusion to donations to political organizations, as de-
fined in section 527, can be seen as reflective of the practices of the
times. In the 1970s, section 501(c)(4) organizations were not signifi-
cant players on the political scene and would not be for more than
three decades. 250 The failure to provide a specific exclusion or deduc-
tion for transfers to section 501(c)(4) organizations in general may
simply be attributable to the fact that donations to such organizations
did not implicate gift tax issues because such donations were almost
invariably below the gift tax annual exclusion amount and, thus, the
issue was moot. 251 However, Congress has had plenty of notice of the
IRS's position on this issue, and its failure to codify an exception for
transfers to section 501(c)(4) organizations casts some doubt on this
line of reasoning.
Second, it is arguable that the transfer of funds to a social welfare
organization for political activity is not a gift but is, instead, a pooling
of funds in which the organization is the receptacle for funds and the
disbursement agent for payments that individual contributors could
248. See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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have made directly themselves without gift tax consequences. In fact,
this rational underpins the income tax exemption for section 501(c)(7)
social clubs. 2 5 2 The notion that the organization is merely a conduit
for donor disbursements or holds property as a trustee for the donors
has had some success as justification for not treating the receipt of
political contributions by political organizations or candidates as in-
come for income tax purposes.253 There appears to be no reason why
a similar argument cannot be made with respect to the gift tax. How-
ever, the notion that an organization is a conduit, alter-ego, trustee, or
similar functionary for donors is belied by the fact that these organiza-
tions exercise discretion in how and when the funds are spent. In ad-
dition to the possibility that an organization's political objectives are
not precisely congruent with the political objectives of its donors, sec-
tion 501(c)(4) organizations, by definition, cannot engage primarily in
political activity and, thus, have objectives and policy goals beyond
political goals.2 5 4 The IRS has rejected this theory in instances where
the organization exercises more than ministerial power over the funds
and is not clearly an agent. 255
Third, the income tax treatment of transfers to section 501(c)(4)
provides evidence that such transfers are not gifts. Intuitively, if a
payment is income it is not a gift and, conversely, if a payment is a gift
it is not income. Gifts are not income for tax purposes. 256 On the one
hand, the fact that donations to an organization are not income im-
plies that such contributions are indeed gifts. However, this begs the
question of why a specific statutory income tax exemption is necessary
for such contributions. Moreover, failure to meet the statutory condi-
252. See JoINT COMM. ON TAX., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FED-
ERAL TAx EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 28 (April 19,
2005) (citing to S. REP. No. 91-552, at 71 (1969)), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.
html?func=startdown&id=1586.
253. See generally Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign
Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2002); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39813, n.32 (Mar. 19, 1990).
The IRS had exempted political donations to candidates and political parties from the income of
the recipients of such donations as early as 1939. However, questions remained as to whether
unexpended funds were income and with respect to the tax status of political organizations in
general. Section 527 was enacted to clarify the income tax status of political organizations. See
Roger Colinvaux, Regulation of Political Organizations and the Red Herring of Tax Exempt Sta-
tus, 59 NAT'L TAX J. 531, 534-35 (2006). Congress, however, appeared to enact section 527
based, in part, on its belief that the IRS did not require tax returns from political organizations,
because the IRS believed virtually all of their receipts were from gifts. See id. at 535-36. Prior
to the enactment of section 527 the income tax treatment of contributions was governed by IRS
rulings. See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem. . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 949, 955 (2005) (discussing rulings prior to the enactment of § 527).
254. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
255. Colinvaux, supra note 253, at 534-35.
256. I.R.C. § 102(a) (CCH 2013).
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tions for tax-exempt status will result in the entity recognizing income
from its donations. A gift to a charity is not a gift-at least for the
income tax purposes of the charity-if the charity engages in political
activity or if the charity's mission does not qualify the organization for
tax-exempt status.257 In addition, section 501(c)(4) organizations must
either report their lobbying expenditures to their donors or pay a
proxy tax.2 58 These rules prevent donors from circumventing the pro-
hibition on the deduction of lobbying expenses by routing such ex-
penditures through a section 501(c)(4) organization. 259 However, the
necessity of such rules presupposes that the payments to the section
501(c)(4) organization are otherwise deductible for income tax pur-
poses. Deductions are, in general, limited to expenditures that are
ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses or ordinary and
necessary expenditures incurred for the production of income or the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income.260 Thus, this presupposition implies that many
transfers to such organizations have some business or income
connection.261
However, for income tax purposes, a gift is a transfer made "from a
'detached and disinterested generosity,' . . . 'out of affection, respect,
admiration, charity or like impulses.' ... 'What controls is the inten-
tion with which payment, however voluntary, has been made." 262
257. Such circumstances would cause the organization to lose its tax-exempt status. See supra
note 160 and accompanying text.
258. I.R.C. §§ 6033(e)(1)(A)(ii), (e)(2) (CCH 2013). The proxy tax, imposed at the highest
rate of corporate tax, provides a possibly less burdensome alternative to allocating membership
dues among lobbying and political activities. The reporting requirement applies to all section
501 organizations, except section 501(c)(3) organizations. I.R.C. § 6033(e)(1)(B)(i) (CCH 2013).
This provision was challenged and ultimately upheld by the D.C. Circuit. See infra note 286 and
accompanying text.
259. Subject to certain narrow exceptions, lobbying and political expenditures are not deducti-
ble for income tax purposes. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(A), (B) (CCH 2013).
260. See I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 212 (CCH 2013). A number of expenditures unrelated either to a
trade or business or to the production of income are allowed by legislative grace. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(2)(D) (CCH 2013) (allowing a deduction for mortgage interest); I.R.C. § 213 (CCH
2013) (allowing a deduction for medical expenses).
261. I.R.C. § 274(b) denies deductions for gifts to individuals in excess of token amounts if the
recipient is entitled to exclude the gift from income pursuant to I.R.C. § 102. However, this
provision should not be interpreted to imply that gifts to which this provision is inapplicable are
deductible. This provision provides that no deduction under section 162 or section 212 are al-
lowed for gifts and the provision is targeted at gifts to individuals with whom the donor has a
business relationship. In essence, this provision prevents income tax deductions for gifts to indi-
viduals that may otherwise have been deductible under general tax principles. See I.R.C.
§ 274(b) (CCH 2013).
262. Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960) (quoting from Comm'r v. LoBue, 351
U.S. 243, 246 (1956), Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952), and Bogardus v.
Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34, 45 (1937) (Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo, Black, J.J., dissenting)).
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Thus, the income tax rules focus on the motive of the payment and not
the consideration received in exchange. In contrast, the gift tax rules
focus on the consideration received in exchange for the payment and
place significantly less importance on the motive for the transfer.263
To be sure, many transfers are gifts for both income and gift tax pur-
poses.264 However, the fact that the status of a transfer as a gift is in
question for income tax purposes due to some element of reciprocity
that is not reducible to money's worth does nothing to resolve its sta-
tus as a gift for gift tax purposes.
Fourth, the legislative history of the gift tax exemption for contribu-
tions to political organizations indicates that Congress did not want
the tax system to discourage political contributions and that the appli-
cation of the tax to donations to section 501(c)(4) organizations is at
odds with congressional intent.265 However, in many respects, the tax
law is decidedly unkind to political expenditures. It prohibits any de-
duction for amounts paid or incurred in influencing legislation, partici-
pating or intervening in any political campaign, attempting to
influence the general public, or segments thereof, with respect to elec-
tions, legislative matters, or referendums, and communicating directly
with certain executive branch officials.266 Moreover, dues paid to cer-
tain tax-exempt organizations that are allocable to such activities are
similarly non-deductible. 267 Deductions for certain indirect contribu-
tions to political parties, such as advertising in convention programs
and other publications and admission costs to dinners and inaugural
events are also not deductible.268 Except for banks, taxpayers are pro-
hibited from taking bad deductions or losses from worthlessness of
debts owed by political parties.269 Finally, transfers of appreciated
property to section 527 organizations are treated as sales or exchanges
of such property thereby triggering the recognition of gain by the do-
nor.270 The assertion that the tax law is not designed to impede politi-
cal activity is based on a very selective view of the evidence.
Finally, another argument for not taxing contributions to section
501(c)(4) organizations-that the purposes of the gift tax is not served
263. The regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 102 do not contain any language that is simi-
lar to the language contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.2512-8 regarding the consideration received by
the donor for the transfer. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.102-1 (1956).
264. For example, transfers of funds or property by a parent to a child are generally gifts for
both income and gift tax purposes.
265. See S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 31 (1974).
266. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1) (CCH 2013).
267. I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (CCH 2013).
268. I.R.C. § 276(a) (CCH 2013).
269. I.R.C. § 271 (CCH 2013).
270. I.R.C. § 84(a) (CCH 2013).
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by such taxation-is similarly inconclusive. The gift tax was enacted
in 1924 "as a backstop to the estate tax" thereby preventing taxpayers
from circumventing the estate tax through lifetime gifts.27 1 Moreover,
the gift tax serves as a deterrent to taxpayers from transferring appre-
ciated property to family members in lower income tax brackets. 272
Transfers to such organizations actually serve the purpose of the es-
tate tax in that they deplete the assets of the donor and ameliorate
concerns about dynastic accumulations of wealth.273 Moreover, it is
not common for taxpayers to make testamentary transfers to these
types of organizations and, consequently, the imposition of a tax on
inter vivos transfers to such organizations serves little purpose from a
policy standpoint.
However, testamentary transfers to section 501(c)(4) organizations
and political organizations are subject to the estate tax. 274 It is quite
possible that such organizations are not often the object of a dece-
dent's bounty because testamentary transfers to such organizations
are taxable. Moreover, many transfers that do not contribute to fam-
ily wealth accumulation are taxable-gifts to non-relatives, for exam-
ple. If the purpose of wealth transfer taxes was solely to prevent
family accumulations of wealth then Congress could have limited their
application to transfers that advanced that purpose.275 Wealth taxes
also raise revenue and that objective should not be overlooked. Per-
haps, as a policy matter, such transfers should be deductible from a
decedent's taxable estate. At present, however, testamentary trans-
fers to such organizations are taxable and this fact hardly supports an
exclusion from gift tax for inter vivos transfers. An exception for an
inter vivos transfer that would otherwise be taxable at death hardly
keeps with the spirit of the gift tax as a backstop to the estate tax.
Despite the statutory and regulatory support for taxation, the impo-
sition of a tax on contributions to social welfare organizations to facili-
271. See supra note 174 and accompanying text; Aprill, supra note 2, at 293-94.
272. Id. at 293.
273. Id. at 323.
274. Deductions that are made from the gross estate to arrive at the taxable estate of a dece-
dent include bequests, legacies, devises, or transfers to organizations similar to those to whom
transfers will not incur gift taxes. However, for estate tax purposes, section 527 organizations
are not included among the organizations eligible for deductible transfers. See I.R.C. § 2055
(CCH 2013). Unlike the gift tax, the estate tax is not burdened with the difficulty of determining
whether a transfer, absent a statutory exception, is subject to tax. An inter vivos transfer can be
many things, a gift being one of them. The estate tax, however, is imposed on the value of the
gross estate of a decedent less statutorily provided deductions and exemptions.
275. Congress has shown it is perfectly capable of determining, with mind-numbing precision,
which parties are related to each other for tax purposes. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267(b) (CCH 2013)
(defining related parties for various income tax purposes).
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tate political speech implicates First Amendment concerns. However,
it is unlikely that the application of the gift tax, a broad based tax, to
such contributions will run afoul of the Constitution.
3. Constitutional Support for Taxability
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the denial of "the right
to pool money through contributions" diminishes freedom of associa-
tion because "funds are often essential if 'advocacy' is to be truly or
optimally 'effective."' 276 Justice Scalia, in Citizens United, supported
corporate speech rights on textual grounds, but he also relied on free-
dom of association for support. 277 Responding to the dissent, Justice
Scalia stated:
The dissent says that when the Framers "constitutionalized the right
to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of
individual Americans that they had in mind." That is no doubt true.
All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individ-
ual men and women-not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But
the individual person's right to speak includes the right to speak in
association with other individual persons.278
Justice Scalia analogized corporate speech to the speech of political
parties and stated that institutional speech is "the speech of many in-
dividual Americans, who have associated in a common cause." 279 The
Court, in NAACP v. Alabama, held that the right of association is not
dependent upon the nature of the beliefs sought to be advanced-be
they political, economic, religious, or cultural. 280 Associational rights
are, moreover, protected not only against direct government restraints
but also indirect restraints, the latter of which are examined to deter-
mine their likelihood of imposing a substantial restraint upon the ex-
ercise of such rights.281 Consequently, whether government
impediments significantly and meaningfully chill association rights is
influenced by the nexus between the group's common cause and the
speech in question.
Citizens United can, and has been, criticized, for its insistence on
broad First Amendment protection for corporations in general. The
common cause of shareholders in a typical for-profit corporation is
276. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1976). See also Citizens Against Rent Control v.
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981) (stating that contribution limits to committees that supported
or opposed ballot measures "is clearly a restraint on the right of association.").
277. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 385-87 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
278. Id. at 391-92 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).
279. Id. at 392.
280. 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
281. Id. at 461-62.
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commercial in nature, and shareholders do not associate in corporate
form to advance political beliefs. The nature of the modern corpora-
tion weakens the claim that restrictions on corporate political activity
diminish individual associational rights. A persuasive case may be
made that associational rights weaken considerably in a large publicly-
traded corporation with hundreds of thousands or, perhaps, millions
of shareholders-arguably, the very entities that Congress had in
mind when it sought to limit corporate political participation. Moreo-
ver, the importance of such rights is placed in further doubt by the fact
that the identity of the shareholders in a publicly traded corporation
change by the minute or, in some cases, by the second. In contrast,
members and donors to political and non-profit organizations have a
focused common cause and, arguably, a stronger basis for objecting to
indirect restraints on their freedom to associate and pool their
resources.
Impediments to associational rights that implicate political speech
are particularly problematic. Political speech is dearly protected
under the First Amendment because its informative tendencies sup-
port vital societal objectives. "Speech is an essential mechanism of
democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the peo-
ple. . . . The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-
government and a necessary means to protect it."282 One scholar
noted the importance of political speech:
[Tithe modern state is personified rather than discovered. Because
that state is merely a human creation, its legitimacy must be estab-
lished and maintained. Unlike other kinds of expression and action,
political speech precisely concerns this matter. This is the general
reason why the Court has traditionally thought that political speech
should be the most protected kind of expression, that government
regulation of political speech has until recently been very limited,
i.e., strictly scrutinized. Indeed, as we shall see, limited government
results in citizens that are more, rather than less, politically active.
Citizens in the modern world often exhibit their political nature
through opposition to the state, not through submission to it.283
However, it is unlikely that the imposition of a gift tax on donations
to section 501(c)(4) organizations constitutes an impermissible indi-
rect restraint on donors' associational rights. Because the gift tax is a
tax of general applicability, exemption for contributions to certain or-
ganizations can be viewed, justifiably, as a subsidy to those organiza-
282. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.
283. Scot J. Zentner, Revisiting McConnell: Campaign Finance and the Problem of Democ-
racy, 23 J.L. & POL. 475, 496 (2007)
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tions. Despite the fact that the gift tax is imposed on the donor,
exemption from the tax indirectly benefits the donee because it
reduces the cost of the contribution to the donor and potentially in-
creases the amount of contributions a donor may be willing to make
to such organizations.284 The benefit of a gift tax exemption is analo-
gous to the benefit that section 501(c)(3) organizations enjoy from the
income tax deduction available for charitable contributions to these
organizations-a benefit the Court has categorized as a subsidy to
these organizations. 285
The Court has held that speakers have no right to have their speech
subsidized by government benefits. Thus, the Court has upheld the
denial of tax deductions for lobbying expenditures in Cammarano v.
United States,286 the conditioning of tax-exempt status for section
501(c)(3) organizations on the refrainment of lobbying activity in Re-
gan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,287 and the qualifi-
cation for postal subsidies by publishers in exchange for their
compliance with certain disclosure requirements in Lewis Publishing
Co. v. Morgan.288 If the trigger for the loss of subsidies is content
neutral, the First Amendment is not violated by the government's fail-
ure to subsidize speech. 289
Arguably, unlike the situations just described, the imposition of a
gift tax constitutes the imposition of a penalty and is not the denial of
a subsidy. However, tax statutes of general applicability, not designed
to suppress particular content, have not been found constitutionally
infirm despite the impact that such statutes may have on the dissemi-
284. See I.R.C. § 2502(c) (CCH 2013).
285. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). The de-
duction for charitable contributions is limited to contributions to or for the use of certain enti-
ties, including several types of non-profit entities. Section 504(c)(4) and section 527 political
organizations are not eligible donees for purposes of the charitable contribution deduction. See
I.R.C. § 170(c) (CCH 2013).
286. 358 U.S. 498 (1959). See also Am. Soc'y of Ass'n Execs. v. United States, 195 F.3d 47
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding the statutory requirement that certain tax exempt organizations ei-
ther report the portion of dues to members that funded lobbying activities or, alternatively, pay a
proxy tax of thirty-five percent).
287. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
288. 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
289. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (quoting
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)). In Speiser v. Randall. 357 U.S. 513
(1958), the Court held that a California law that conditioned the receipt of a property tax credit
by veterans on the veterans' signing a statement that they did not advocate the overthrow of the
government was unconstitutional because the law, in part, was designed to punish "dangerous
ideas." Id. at 59.
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nation of speech.290 In Leathers v. Medlock, the Court upheld the im-
position of a sales tax on sales by cable operators despite the existence
of an exemption from the tax for several other forms of media
purchases. 291 According to the Court, "differential taxation of speak-
ers, even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amend-
ment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of
suppressing, particular ideas." 292 In contrast, taxes that are imposed
on a small, select group of transactions, whose subject matter is pro-
tected by the First Amendment, have been struck down.293 The gift
tax is a tax of general applicability and is not designed to suppress
particular ideas or content. Moreover, imposition of the tax to all do-
nations to section 501(c)(4) organizations, whether politically active or
not, further supports the content neutrality of the tax.
In one respect, however, the imposition of the gift tax to transfers to
section 501(c)(4) organizations could be problematic. In Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington, a concurring opinion in-
dicated that the ability of an organization to use alternate means to
engage in a protected activity without the government subsidy was
critical to the upholding of the statute.294 In that case, the Court up-
held the statute's conditioning of a section 501(c)(3) organization's
tax-exempt status on the organization's refrainment from lobbying ac-
tivity.2 95 According to the concurrence, the loss of the organization's
tax exemption would have precluded its receipt of deductible contri-
butions and, thus, significantly impeded its ability to raise funds for
any purpose.296 However, the ability of such organizations to estab-
lish separate section 501(c)(4) organizations that may engage in lobby-
ing provided such organizations with an alternative means of
conducting lobbying activities without the loss of their tax-exempt sta-
tus. 2 9 7 Similarly, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld the withholding
290. The mere existence of an income tax impedes the dissemination of ideas because it
reduces the disposable income with which a person could disseminate ideas or purchase ideas for
consumption.
291. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
292. Id. at 453.
293. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)
(holding that a tax on paper and ink that applied to a small subset of newspaper publishers was
unconstitutional); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (holding that a gross
receipts tax on the sale of advertisements by certain newspapers was unconstitutional because it
was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of
information")
294. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 549, 551-52 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
295. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
296. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 552-53.
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of federal funds from family planning organizations that discussed
abortion as a family planning option in large part because a family
planning organization could provide such information through a sepa-
rate organization that did not receive federal funds.298
As previously discussed, section 501(c)(4) organizations may form
separate segregated funds that are deemed section 527 political orga-
nizations.299 Consequently, political activities can be undertaken by
such segregated funds without the imposition of gift tax on donors to
such funds. However, section 501(c)(4) organizations that undertake
lobbying activities have no alternative methods of undertaking such
activities without the imposition of a gift tax on their donors.3M It is
not clear whether this fact could prove problematic because the courts
have not been consistent in their insistence that an alternative channel
of communication be present.301 In any event, it is arguable that the
logic of Cammarano should apply to this situation.302 Because the gift
tax applies to donations to any section 501(c)(4) organization, an ex-
emption for donations that fund such organizations' lobbying activi-
ties would be a subsidy for lobbying activities. 303 Cammarano is clear
that the government need not subsidize lobbying activities. 304
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST TAXATION
The IRS's position that contributions to section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions are subject to gift tax has support in the statutory language and
the regulatory definition of a gift and may very well pass muster under
the deferential standards of Mayo and Chevron. Moreover, it does
not appear that enforcement of the gift tax for such donations would
face constitutional impediments. However, such enforcement is not
justified from a policy standpoint.
Despite the fact that the statute leaves ample room for interpreta-
tion of the term "gift," there is something to be said for a method of
statutory interpretation that considers the everyday, commonsense
meaning of a term with which people are generally familiar. The Car-
son court's definition of a gift is probably better aligned with people's
understanding of that term than a definition that ignores any recipro-
cal benefit that is not reducible to money's worth. Moreover, many
298. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
299. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
300. Lobbying is not considered an exempt function. See Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(c)(1) (1985).
301. See Aprill, supra note 2, at 319-20 n.173-74.
302. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
303. See Colinvaux, supra note 253, at 538-39 for an excellent discussion of whether a tax
exemption is, in fact, a subsidy.
304. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 12:51
Gwr TAXES ON DONATIONS
section 501(c)(4) organizations, such as volunteer firefighters' associa-
tions or community organizations that maintain free-parking for visi-
tors, serve missions that unlikely would cause a donor to consider a
donation to such organizations a taxable transaction.305 In fact, many
section 501(c)(4) organizations serve missions that could qualify them
as section 501(c)(3) organizations, and their tax status reflects an orga-
nizational preference for operational flexibility-a flexibility that, for
the most part, is sought for the ability to lobby and engage in political
activity. 306 Moreover, Carson's reasoning is particularly apt to the ex-
tent that donors contribute to an organization such as the AARP or
the NRA to enhance the organization's ability to achieve legislative
objectives with which the donor shares a particularly strong affinity.
Large donations to such organizations for political purposes are the
obvious target of IRS enforcement. Let us assume, however, that the
statutory cover provided for contributions to political organizations
defined in section 527 is meant to be exclusive and that such exclusiv-
ity is meant to subject such contributions to the statutory disclosure
requirements.307 Assuming that this result is desirable, subjecting all
transfers to section 501(c)(4) organizations to the gift tax is a poor
method of achieving this result.
It is likely that the imposition of the gift tax on donations to section
501(c)(4) organizations will tend to force political donors to divert
substantial contributions to section 527 organizations or force section
501(c)(4) organizations to create segregated funds that are treated as
section 527 organizations to receive such contributions. 308 To that ex-
tent, the threat of the gift tax will serve to bring political donors into
the open. However, gift tax enforcement will not deter mega-donors
from participation in the political process. The very wealthy could ei-
ther undertake their activities directly without the need for organiza-
tional intermediaries or form their own political organizations. 309
305. See Rev. Rul. 87-126, 1987-2 C.B. 150; Rev. Rul. 81-116, 1981-1 C.B. 333.
306. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. Section 501(c)(3) organizations enjoy a
fund raising advantage over section 501(c)(4) organizations due to the fact that contributions to
the former organizations qualify for the charitable deduction for income tax purposes, while
contributions to the latter organizations do not. See I.R.C. § 170 (CCH 2013). The regulations
provide that a charitable mission can include the promotion of social welfare. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1990). Oftentimes, the distinction between these two types of organiza-
tions is dependent upon the breadth of the class of beneficiaries served. See Aprill, supra note 2,
at 299-300.
307. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
309. Several wealthy donors have already formed their own Super PACs. See Raymond Her-
nandez, Bloomberg Starts 'Super Pac,' Seeking National Influence, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 17, 2012)
(reporting on the formation of a Super PAC by New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg); Sara
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Moreover, corporations owned by a large number of shareholders
would be undeterred by the threat of a gift tax. Although the gift tax
is applicable only to individuals, the regulations deal with the possibil-
ity that entities such as trusts, corporations, partnerships, and the like
become vehicles through which gifts are laundered. 310 The gift tax
applies to gifts that are made indirectly, and gifts by a corporation are
deemed to be gifts made by the shareholders. 311 This provision ap-
pears to be aimed at closely-held corporations because these entities,
typically family-owned, offer the greatest possibilities of intra-family
gift-giving. This provision will provide little deterrence to corpora-
tions with a large number of shareholders because it is unlikely that
any individual shareholder's allocable portion of the gift will exceed
the gift tax annual exclusion, which is presently set at $14,000.312 Con-
sequently, section 501(c)(4) organizations could very well continue
their political activities with corporate funding. In light of the hand-
wringing over Citizens United, the possibility of corporate dominance
over section 501(c)(4) organizations' political activities is, most likely,
not a welcome possibility.313
Murray & Brody Mullins, Investor Bankrolls Big Romney Campaign, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17,
2012, 1:35 PM) (reporting on the formation of a Super PAC by Joe Ricketts, the billionaire
founder of Ameritrade).
310. The gift tax is applicable to individual taxpayers. See supra note 173 and accompanying
text.
311. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(c)(1) (1997), 25.2511-1(h)(1) (1997). Although not expressly
stated in the regulations, similar principles presumably would apply to treat gifts by a trust,
partnership, or limited liability company as gifts by the beneficial owners, partners, and mem-
bers, respectively. Single-member limited liability companies not electing to be taxed as corpo-
rations are ignored for federal income tax purposes, and any gifts by such entities would be
considered a direct gift by the single member. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii) (2006).
312. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. The regulations provide no guidance in de-
termining how gifts are to be allocated among shareholders. Presumably, gifts are allocated
according to shareholdings on the date that the gifts are made. Also, if a shareholder is not an
individual but an entity then a further allocation must be made until the gift is allocable to an
individual. This author is unaware of the application of this provision to a publicly-traded
corporation.
313. Corporations would enjoy a similar advantage with respect to the lobbying activities of
section 501(c)(4) organizations. Corporations also fund lobbying activities through section
501(c)(6) organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce was, based on dollars spent, the most prolific lobbying organization in 2012. See supra
note 153. The SEC is considering requiring the disclosure of corporate political and lobbying
activity. See Office of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, Disclosure Regarding the Use of Corporate
Resources for Political Activities, available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaView
Rule?publd=201210&RIN=3235-AL36. The imposition of such a disclosure requirement has
generated vigorous debate between proponents and opponents of the requirement. See Nicholas
Confessore, S.E.C. Is Asked to Require Disclosure of Donations, N.Y. TIMEs (April 23, 2013).
Opinion on the desirability of such a disclosure requirement is decidedly mixed. Compare J.W.
Verret, The SEC Ponders Circumventing Citizens United, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2013, 7:14 PM)
with Thomas P. DiNapoli & Bill de Blasio, Companies: Show Us the Money, N.Y. TiMEs (Mar.
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Finally, the imposition of the gift tax to donations to section
501(c)(4) organizations will raise the issue of politically-motivated, se-
lective enforcement of the tax. Moreover, to the extent the agency
does, in fact, serve a political master, there are little or no judicial
checks to assure that the agency enforces the tax in an evenhanded
manner. The IRS has undertaken questionable actions in recent years
that suggest to its critics that it has been enlisted to serve political
agendas.
In the midst of the financial crisis in 2008, the Treasury and the Fed-
eral Reserve were eager to have financially sound institutions sub-
sume their more troubled brethren.314 Not surprisingly, many
troubled institutions had significant net operating losses for federal
income tax purposes that, if available to a suitor, would facilitate their
21, 2013). Access to the ballot for shareholder proposals concerning corporate political activity
may be challenged by the corporation on the grounds that such activity is exclusively a manage-
rial prerogative. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-8(i)(7) (2008); Abbott Laboratories, SEC No-Action
Letter (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2009/
aflcio021109-14a8.pdf. But see Bank of America, SEC Response of the Office of the Chief
Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin. (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8/2013/stephenjohnsonO2l513-14a8.pdf (concluding that a shareholder proposal
could not be excluded from the ballot under 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14-8(i)(3) or 240.14-8(i)(3) (2008)).
Recently, the New York State Common Retirement Fund filed suit to compel Qualcomm, Inc. to
disclose its political activity. Dan Strumpf, Qualcomm Sued Over Political-Giving Records,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2013, 6:24 PM). Corporate political activity may be motivated, in significant
part, by the personal objectives of executives. A relatively recent study examined the relation-
ship between political donations and firm returns. A positive relation between donations and
firm returns indicates that such donations are driven by firm objectives, whereas a negative rela-
tion between donations and returns implies that donations were motivated to a great extent by
management's desire to demonstrate its power and prestige or obtain high-profile cabinet or
ambassadorial positions. The authors found a negative correlation between donations and firm
returns. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke & Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Political Contri-
butions: Investments or Agency? (June 25, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=972670. The Center for Responsive Politics reported that forty major
ambassadorships were granted to large donors of George Bush and the Republican Party be-
tween 2000 and 2004 and that thirty-three of such ambassadorships were given to corporate chief
executive officers, presidents, founders, or their immediate family members. Id. at 11.
314. The economy began to weaken in 2007, and by March of 2008 the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York agreed to provide approximately $29 billion as a loss guarantee to facilitate the
acquisition of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan. J.P. Morgan bore the risk of the first $1.15 billion of
losses, and the New York Federal Reserve took on the next $28.82 billion of risk. See FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL INQUIRY REPORT 290 (2011) [hereinafter CRISIS RE-
PORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission, a ten-member panel appointed by Congress, was created by the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5, 123 Stat. 1617, 1625-31,
to examine the causes of the financial crisis. By October of that year, Lehman Brothers failed,
the federal government became an owner of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and $85 billion of
loans from the government were authorized to the giant insurer, American International Group.
See CRISIs REPORT, supra note 314, at 309-343. In October, the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) was born as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-343, § 101, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (2008).
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acquisition. However, federal tax law severely limits the utility of ac-
quired net operating loss carryforwards. 315 Tax accounting principles
do not assure that all economic losses incurred by the acquired entity
prior to acquisition are reflected in the net operating loss figure at the
time of acquisition, and, consequently, the statute creates a rebuttable
presumption that certain losses that are realized post-acquisition are
subject to the same limitations as the net operating losses
themselves.316
On September 30, 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis, the IRS
released Notice 2008-83.31' The notice provided acquirers of troubled
banks with tax benefits that, in all likelihood, were unavailable under
the statute. In effect, bad debt losses incurred post-acquisition on the
acquired bank's loan portfolio would not be subject to the presump-
tion that such losses were incurred prior to the acquisition and, thus,
subject to the statute's strictures. 18 Bank acquirers were relieved of
its burden of proof to show that such losses were incurred post-acqui-
sition.319 The notice was immediately criticized as a bailout for the
315. Once a statutory threshold change in ownership occurs, net operating losses that arose
prior to the ownership change are available to offset only a limited amount of taxable income in
any taxable year. That limit, the section 382 limitation, is equal to the value of the old loss
corporation multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt rate. I.R.C. § 382(b)(1) (CCH 2013). Some
corporations have gone to great lengths to protect themselves from the application of section 382
by using poison pills, a technique usually reserved to deter unwanted takeovers. In their basic
form, poison pills allow existing shareholders to acquire additional stock at a bargain price in the
event an unwanted suitor accumulates an amount of stock in the corporation exceeding a de-
fined threshold, typically fifteen to twenty percent. To deter ownership changes under section
382, corporations have lowered the triggering threshold to just under five percent. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court has upheld the use of poison pills. See Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5
A.3d 586 (Del. 2010). See also Serena Ng & Randall Smith, AIG Raises Tax Shield, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 10, 2011, 12:01 AM) (describing the adoption of a plan by American International Group,
Inc. to protect its ability to use over $32 billion in net operating losses); Dana Mattioli, Kodak Is
Exploring Sale of Patent in Apple Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2011) (reporting that Kodak
adopted an anti-takeover plan that is triggered if a party acquired more than 4.9 percent of
Kodak stock, that is intended to insure that its net operating losses would be available to shield
gains from patent sales).
316. I.R.C. § 382(h)(1)(B), (2)(B) (CCH 2013).
317. I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905.
318. Section 2 of the I.R.S. Notice, its operative provision, states:
For purposes of section 382(h), any deduction properly allowed after an ownership
change (as defined in section 382(g)) to a bank with respect to losses on loans or bad
debts (including any deduction for a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts)
shall not be treated as a built-in loss or a deduction that is attributable to periods
before the change date.
Id.
319. During the financial crisis, this would have been a tall order indeed. Bank holdings were
souring well before the issuance of Notice 2008-83. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Wall St. Banks
Confront a String of Write-Downs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2008); David Leonhardt, Holding On,
N.Y. TmHEs, Apr. 6, 2008, at MM10. For a fascinating look at the behind-the-scenes negotiations
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banking industry.320 Congress eventually overturned Notice 2008-83
with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 and made clear its displeasure with the IRS. 3 2 1 Despite the fact
that Congress acted to preserve its legislative prerogatives, it did so
only prospectively. The new law applied only to transactions that oc-
curred after January 16, 2009 and the notice would remain in effect for
ownership changes that occurred pursuant to contracts and certain
written agreements that were entered into on or before January 16,
2009.322
More recently, regulations have been issued that appear to contra-
dict the statute that provides tax credits for certain purchasers of
health insurance. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
segments the health insurance market into four markets: the individ-
ual market; two employer provided group insurance markets, the
small and large group market, based on the size of the employer; and
the Exchanges. 323 By January 1, 2014, each state must create and op-
that took place between various financial institutions and the effect that inflated loan values had
on those negotiations, see ANDREw Ross SORKIN, Too BIG To FAIL (2011).
320. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, Obscure Tax Breaks Increase Cost of Financial Rescue, Wall St. J.
(Oct. 18, 2008, 12:01 AM); Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for U.S. Banks, WASH. POST (Nov.
10, 2008) (describing the reaction of several tax lawyers to the notice). One Wall Street tax
authority observed that "[iut couldn't be clearer if they had taken out an ad." Joe Nocera, So
When Will Banks Give Loans?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2008) (quoting tax expert Robert Willens).
Senators Schumer of New York and Grassley of Iowa questioned the propriety of the notice and
the latter requested an internal Treasury review of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
the notice. Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Seeks Answers from IRS,
Treasury on Tax Code Change that Subsidizes Bank Acquisitions (Oct. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/record.cfm?id=304737&&year=2008&; Press Re-
lease, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Seeks Inspector General Review of Treasury Bank
Merger Move (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?cus-
tomeldataPageIDj1502=18109. The Treasury's inspector general admitted that a legitimate ar-
gument could be made that the IRS exceeded its authority in issuing the notice. See CRISIS
REPORT, supra note 314, at 371.
321. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261, 123 Stat.
115, 342-43. Section 1261(a) of the legislation stated Congress' findings as follows:
(1) The delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury under section 382(m)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 does not authorize the Secretary to provide
exemptions or special rules that are restricted to particular industries or classes of
taxpayers.
(2) Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is inconsistent with the congressional in-
tent in enacting such section 382(m).
(3) The legal authority to prescribe Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is
doubtful.
Id.
322. Id.
323. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1304,1312, 124 Stat.
at 171, 182 (2010). On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
individual insurance mandate, perhaps the most controversial portion of this legislation. See
Nat'l Fed'n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Although the Court held that the
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erate an Exchange that offers insurance for purchase by individuals
and employees of small employers.324 The Exchanges are intended to
function as insurance marketplaces in which individuals have the abil-
ity to comparison shop for insurance products, and the federal govern-
ment will subsidize state Exchanges until January 1, 2015.325
However, a state may opt out of creating and operating an Exchange,
in which case the Exchange will be established by the federal
government. 326
Federal tax credits are provided for individuals and families who
purchase insurance through an Exchange, whose income is below a
certain threshold, and who do not obtain insurance through their em-
ployer.327 The credit appears to be limited to taxpayers who are en-
rolled in state Exchanges. 328 However, regulations were issued
recently that would also allow participants in federally assisted Ex-
changes to qualify for the credit.329 These regulations have come
under attack.330
Both of these instances are examples of the IRS issuing taxpayer
friendly guidance-unusual for this agency-that appear to contra-
vene the statute. Typically, taxpayers are unable to challenge such ac-
tions due to lack of standing. The two examples described above are
atypical in that both dealt with highly visible, politicized subject mat-
ter: the bank bailouts and ObamaCare. Notice 2008-83 was over-
turned, albeit prospectively, by Congress as a result of the negative
publicity generated by the Notice. The health care tax credit regula-
tions are being challenged but only because this tax credit has an unu-
sual feature: qualification for the credit triggers a penalty that is
imposed on employers of the taxpayers that qualify for the credit.33 1
imposition of the individual mandate was impermissible under the commerce power, the Court
also held that the imposition of the mandate was a proper exercise of Congress' taxing power.
Id. at 2593, 2600. Seven Justices also struck down the statute's expansion of Medicaid as imper-
missibly coercive to the states and held that states could decline to expand Medicaid eligibility
without the loss of federal funds provided under existing programs. See id. at 2606-07.
324. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311(b), 124 Stat. at 173.
325. Id. § 1311(d)(5)(A), 124 Stat. at 178.
326. Id. § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186.
327. I.R.C. § 36B (CCH 2013).
328. See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2) (CCH 2013).
329. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.36B-1(k), 1.36B-2(a) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2012).
330. See Louise Radnofsky, Health Law Opponents Challenge Tax Credit, WALL ST. J. (July
17, 2012, 9:42 PM).
331. See Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV-11-030-RAW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
113232 (E.D. Okla., filed Jan. 21, 2011). See also Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon,
Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPA CA,
23 HEALTH MAmRIX 119, 120 n.4 (2013). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
§§ 1513, 10106(e), 124 Stat. at 253-56, 910-11, added § 4980H to the I.R.C. This provision im-
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As a result, these employers have standing to challenge the regula-
tions. Moreover, these regulations are not the only example of this
phenomenon with respect to ObamaCare. The Obama administration
has recently announced that enforcement of the statute's employer
mandate, effective January 1, 2014, will not go into effect until 2015.332
Typically, tax pronouncements that favor a taxpayer or group of
taxpayers cannot be challenged due to lack of standing. Therefore, if
the IRS does selectively enforce the gift tax then its decisions not to
enforce that tax against certain donors will be immune from legal
challenge.
Frothingham v. Mellon is the foundational case for federal taxpayer
standing jurisprudence.33 3 In that case, a taxpayer alleged that the
poses an exaction on certain employers if they do not offer insurance coverage to their employ-
ees or offer coverage that is deemed inadequate under the statute and at least one full-time
employee is allowed a tax credit or cost-sharing reduction. See I.R.C. § 4980H(a) (CCH 2013).
The Fourth Circuit has recently held that Liberty University had standing to challenge the em-
ployer mandate and upheld the constitutionality of the employer mandate. See Liberty Univ.,
Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 83 (4th Cir. 2013). The government argued that Liberty had failed to
establish standing because it is speculative whether Liberty will be subject to an assessable pay-
ment due to its provision minimum essential health insurance coverage that may satisfy the stat-
ute's affordability criteria, thereby precluding the application of the penalty. Id. at 90.
According to the court:
Liberty need not show that it will be subject to an assessable payment to establish
standing if it otherwise alleges facts that establish standing. In this case, in addition to
alleging that it "could" be subject to an assessable payment, Liberty alleges that the
employer mandate and its "attendant burdensome regulations will . . . increase the cost
of care" and "directly and negatively affect [it] by increasing the cost of providing
health insurance coverage." . . . [T]o establish standing, Liberty need not prove that the
employer mandate will increase its costs of providing health coverage; it need only
plausibly allege that it will.
Id. at 89-90 (emphasis in original).
332. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116 (July 9, 2013); Louise Radnofsky, Health
Law Penalties Delayed, WALL ST. J. (July 3, 2013, 9:55 AM). The statute imposes an exaction on
certain employers if they do not offer insurance coverage to their employees or if they offer
coverage that is deemed inadequate under the statute. This provision is effective on January 1,
2014, and the statute contains no provision for delaying its effective date. See generally I.R.C.
§ 4980H (CCH 2013). Two attorneys that played pivotal roles in the constitutional challenge to
the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate have posited that individuals may maintain stand-
ing to challenge the delay in the enforcement of the employer mandate due to its effect on
individuals that purchase health insurance. They assert that, due to the comprehensive and coor-
dinated nature of the various statutory provisions, the suspension of one provision has deleteri-
ous effects on persons subject to other provisions. In this case, the lack of an employer mandate
may force an individual who otherwise may have obtained employer coverage to purchase her
own insurance. See David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Why the President's ObarnaCare Ma-
neuver May Backfire, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2013, 5:22 PM). It appears that the logic of Wright v.
Allen would preclude standing on such a theory. See infra notes 342-48 and accompanying text.
333. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The standing requirement is rooted in Arti-
cle III of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and .. . to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be party . . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. A detailed
112 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
Federal Maternity Act of 1921, a statute that provided financing to
states in order to reduce infant and maternal mortality, violated the
Tenth Amendment and that the federal expenditures under the statute
increased her tax bill in violation of due process. 334 The Court held
that the taxpayer failed to present a justiciable case or controversy
but, instead, raised a "matter of public and not individual concern"
resolvable only through political means.335 The Court reasoned that
the effect of the expenditures on her federal tax liability was too "re-
mote, fluctuating and uncertain" and that her "interest in the moneys
of the Treasury" was "shared with millions of others." 336 The invoca-
tion of federal judicial power requires a party to show "not only that
the statute is invalid but that he has sustained .. . some direct injury as
the result of its enforcement, not merely that he suffers in some indefi-
nite way in common with people generally." 337
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, several
organizations promoting access to health care for the poor alleged
discussion of the constitutional and prudential underpinnings of the standing requirement and
the criticism to which it has been subject is beyond the scope of this work. For a detailed analy-
sis of standing see Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending - The Role of Legal and Equitable
Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 1, 25-27 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1265 (1961); Louis L. Jaffe, Taxpayers'
Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960). The Court recently denied the petition-
ers standing in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), the high-profile case involving the
constitutionality of Proposition 8, a California ballot measure that amended the California con-
stitution to limit marriage to heterosexual unions. The state of California did not appeal the
decision of the federal district court that held that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional. Id. at 12.
The decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit by the official proponents of the ballot measure,
and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court on the merits after concluding that the appellants
had standing to appeal. Id. at 14-15. The Ninth Circuit had certified a question to the California
Supreme Court that inquired whether, under California law, the official proponents of a ballot
measure possessed a particularized interest in the measure's validity sufficient for them to assert
the State's interest in the matter. The California Supreme Court responded affirmatively. Id. at
12-13. The Court, however, held that the official proponents of a ballot measure had suffered an
injury that was indistinguishable from the injury suffered by the citizens of California in general.
Id. at 20. Moreover, the petitioners were not, according to the Court, acting as agents of the
state, but were instead acting as private citizens. Id. at 23-33.
334. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479, 486-88 (1923).
335. Id. at 487-89.
336. Id. at 487.
337. Id. at 488. The Court distinguished this case from its decision in Crampton v. Zabriskie,
101 U.S. 601 (1879), a decision that let a local taxpayer action stand. In the Court's opinion,
local taxpayers' stake in the local treasury are direct and immediate, unlike federal taxpayers'
interest in the federal treasury. Frothingham, 262 U.S at 486. In a relatively recent case, the
Court made clear that Frothingham applies with equal force to taxpayer challenges to state tax
and spending provisions. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that property tax relief and a state
tax credit granted to the DaimlerChrysler Corp. pursuant to a contract entered into between the
corporation and the City of Toledo violated the Commerce Clause. See DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
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that the IRS violated section 501(c)(3) by granting a tax exemption to
two hospitals without conditioning the tax exemption closely enough
to the hospitals' charitable care for the indigent.338 The plaintiffs as-
serted that the IRS's action encouraged the hospitals to deny services
to the members and clients of the plaintiff organizations. 339 Despite
conceding that the plaintiffs had, indeed, suffered an injury in fact, the
Court denied the plaintiffs standing because Article III "still requires
that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results
from the independent action of some third party not before the
court."3 4 0 According to the Court, whether the tax exemption en-
couraged the denial of medical service was purely speculative. Corre-
spondingly, whether removal of the exemption would result in the
availability of such services was equally speculative because it was
plausible that the hospitals in question would forego the tax exemp-
tion and operate unfettered by the restrictions imposed by such
exemption. 341
Likewise, the Court denied standing in Allen v. Wright, another case
challenging taxpayers' tax-exempt status.342 An outstanding IRS rul-
ing denied tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools.
A nationwide class action was brought on behalf of the plaintiffs, their
children, and all parents of African-American children that attended
schools in public school systems undergoing desegregation. The plain-
tiffs alleged that some private schools in desegregating school districts
were, in fact, discriminatory and that the IRS failed to assure that its
policies were implemented by the tax-exempt private schools.343 The
harms alleged were two-fold. First, the IRS's conduct amounted to
tangible federal support for racially segregated institutions.344 Sec-
ond, the conduct interfered with the desegregation efforts of the
school districts by encouraging the operation and expansion of segre-
gated educational institutions.345 The Court held that the first injury
was not cognizable because, in the absence of allegations that the
plaintiffs were personally affected by discriminatory conduct, their al-
338. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 30-32 (1976).
339. Id. at 32-33.
340. Id. at 40-42.
341. Id. at 42-44.
342. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
343. Id. at 744-45.
344. Id. at 745.
345. Id.
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legations amounted to a mere assertion of a right to have the govern-
ment act in accordance with the law.3 4 6
With respect to the second alleged injury, the Court found that the
plaintiffs had asserted an injury in fact. The Court held that the sec-
ond injury, the diminished opportunity for the plaintiffs' children to
receive an education in a racially integrated school, was judicially cog-
nizable and, in light of Brown v. Board of Education, that it was one
of the most serious injuries recognized by the legal system. 347 How-
ever, citing Simon, the Court stated that:
The line of causation between that conduct and desegregation of
respondents' schools is attenuated at best. From the perspective of
the IRS, the injury to respondents is highly indirect and "results
from the independent action of some third party not before the
court." . . . The diminished ability of respondents' children to re-
ceive a desegregated education would be fairly traceable to unlaw-
ful IRS grants of tax exemptions only if there were enough racially
discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in respon-
dents' communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an
appreciable difference in public school integration.. . . Moreover, it
is entirely speculative . . . whether withdrawal of a tax exemption
from any particular school would lead the school to change its
policies.348
Taxpayer standing is countenanced only with respect to Establish-
ment Clause violations, the so-called Flast exception. In the seminal
case of Flast v. Cohen, the plaintiff alleged that the allocation of funds
to religious schools, pursuant to the Federal Education Act of 1965,
violated the Establishment Clause.349 The Court set forth a two prong
test for standing. First, the plaintiff must "establish a logical link" be-
tween her status as a taxpayer and the legislation at issue.350 The
Court then clarified that, in order to satisfy this prong of the test, the
act challenged must be an act of Congress made pursuant to its Article
I, Section 8 power to tax and spend for the general welfare.351 The
plaintiff, according to the Court, suffered a direct financial injury in
the form of tax money spent in violation of specific constitutional pro-
tections.352 Second, "the taxpayer must establish a nexus" between
her status as a taxpayer and the alleged constitutional violation.353
346. Id. at 753-56.
347. Allen, 468 U.S. at 756.
348. Id. at 757-58 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976)).
349. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
350. Id. at 102.
351. Id. at 102-03.
352. Id. at 106.
353. Id. at 102.
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This test is met if the violation alleged implicates a clear limitation on
congressional power under Article I, Section 8. According to the
Court, the Establishment Clause serves as a "specific constitutional
limitation" on Congress' power to tax and spend under Article I, Sec-
tion 8 because the framers adopted the Establishment Clause as a re-
sult of their fear that "the taxing and spending power would be used
to favor one religion over another or to support religion in gen-
eral." 354 The Court distinguished this case from Frothingham on the
ground that Frothingham involved Fifth and Tenth Amendment
claims, two provisions that do not impose clear limitations on Con-
gress' power to tax and spend.355
Flast has been narrowly applied, and allegations of violations of
other constitutional provisions have not fared well.356 Moreover, the
Court has refused to apply Flast to alleged constitutional violations by
the Executive branch.357
Due to the standing requirement, taxpayers cannot challenge an
IRS decision not to enforce the gift tax on donations to section
501(c)(4) organizations. The issuance of Revenue Ruling 2008-83 and
the regulations interpreting the health insurance tax credit have been
criticized as an attempt to avoid politically difficult decisions by exec-
utive fiat.358 To be sure, these actions dealt with the government
354. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103-04.
355. Id. at 105.
356. Less than a decade after Flast was decided, the Court denied standing to a taxpayer who
sought to enforce the "Accounts Clause" contained in Article I, § 9 by requiring Congress to
publish the portion of the federal budget earmarked for the Central Intelligence Agency.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). The Court, in the same year, also denied
taxpayer standing in a case that asserted that membership in the military reserves by a member
of Congress violated Article I, § 6 of the Constitution. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). More recently, the Court refused to extend Flast to alleged Com-
merce Clause violations. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347 (2006) (stating
that "[w]hatever rights plaintiffs have under the Commerce Clause, they are fundamentally un-
like the right not to 'contribute three pence' . . . for the support of any one [religious] establish-
ment ") (quoting 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).
357. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 479-80 (1982) (holding that the taxpayer lacked standing because the challenged action
was taken pursuant to Article IV, § 3 and not, as Flast requires, pursuant to Article 1, § 8 and
because the alleged violation was not committed by Congress but by an executive agency). The
Court, however, found Flast applicable to agency action in the administration of a specific con-
gressional mandate holding that the distinction between congressional action and agency action
is not relevant when the agency's action is "at heart a program of disbursement of funds pursu-
ant to Congress' taxing and spending powers." Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619-20 (1988).
A very recent case indicates that Bowen is to be narrowly construed to apply only to situations in
which expenditures are made pursuant to a statutory mandate and not to situations in which
expenditures are funded by general appropriations and made at the discretion of the executive
branch. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 607 (2007).
358. See supra notes 317-330 and accompanying text.
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bailout of financial institutions and ObamaCare, both politically sensi-
tive issues. However, it is arguable that the one area where agency
decisions are most likely to be interpreted as politics disguised as dis-
cretion is enforcement of the tax law with respect to political contribu-
tions. The express statutory prohibition on the exertion of influence
by executive branch officials over the IRS is unlikely to quell public
perception that political factors have influenced decisions to enforce
or not enforce the gift tax.359
The recent disclosure that the IRS was contemplating enforcement
of the gift tax against donors to section 501(c)(4) organizations was
met with the expected accusations that the agency's actions were an
attempt to hinder Republican fund-raising efforts, as was the attempt
by New York's attorney general to obtain tax information on section
501(c)(4) organizations from the IRS.3 6 0 More recently, the IRS is-
sued an apology for admittedly subjecting conservative organizations
to inappropriate scrutiny during the 2012 campaign season in its re-
view of their applications for section 501(c)(4) status.361 Despite the
agency's assertion that the actions in question were undertaken by ca-
reer civil servants against whom no political pressure was exerted, Re-
publican leaders were not mollified by the apology, and evidence
surfaced that the controversial actions were more widespread than ini-
tially believed. 362 It takes little imagination to envision that serious
efforts by the IRS to enforce the tax against some donors but not
others will be met by assertions that the IRS has been enlisted as a
political weapon. Ironically, political meddling with the IRS-one of
the Nixonian practices that, to a great extent, led to the passage of
359. See I.R.C. § 7217 (CCH 2013). Church investigations are subject to heightened taxpayer
protections. See I.R.C. § 7611 (CCH 2013). Despite the statutory protections, investigations are
often met with accusations of political motives. See Leslie S. Garthwaite, Comment, An End to
Politically Motivated Audits of Churches? How Amendment to Section 7217 Can Preserve Integ-
rity in the Tax Investigation of Churches Under Section 7611, 60 THE TAX LAW. 503 (2007) (dis-
cussing the IRS investigation into the activities of the All Saints Episcopal Church).
360. Bernie Becker, Tax Writers Fire Off Warning to NY AG, THE HILL (Sept. 17, 2012, 5:21
PM) http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/domestic-taxes/125612-tax-writers-fire-off-warning-
to-ny-ag.
361. John D. McKinnon & Corey Boles, IRS Apologizes for Scrutiny of Conservative Groups,
WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2013, 4:23 PM); Jonathan Weisman, I.R.S. Apologizes to Tea Party Groups
Over Audits of Applications for Tax Exemption, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2013).
362. Jonathan Weisman, Mismanagement by I.R.S. Cited in Tea Party Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2013, at Al; John D. McKinnon & Siobhan Hughes, FBI Launches Probe of IRS, WALL
ST. J., May 15, 2013, at Al; John D. McKinnon & Siobhan Hughes, Wider Problems Found at
IRS, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2013, at Al. President Obama forced the resignation of acting IRS
Commissioner Steven Miller as a result of the scandal. See John D. McKinnon, Evan Perez &
Damian Paletta, Tax Scandal Fells IRS Chief WALL ST. J., May 16, 2013, at Al. For a compen-
dium of sources discussing this scandal, see http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof-blog/irs-news/
(last visited June 26, 2013).
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campaign reform legislation-may very well become a byproduct of
an effort to do justice to the spirit of the campaign finance laws.36 3
Whether, in fact, the IRS is subject, and ultimately succumbs, to politi-
cal pressure is beside the point if the public perceives that such pres-
sure has been exerted and heeded.
The exposure of the funding sources behind political activities to
the sunlight of disclosure is a laudable objective. Use of the gift tax to
drive political activity out of section 501(c)(4) organizations, despite
the constitutional and statutory support for this technique, is poor pol-
icy. A more effective approach, similar to the proxy tax scheme im-
posed on section 501(c)(4) organizations, is to focus on disclosure and
provide such organizations with a choice. 364 Section 501(c)(4) organi-
zations can either conduct all their political activity through a sister
section 527 organization or segregated fund or, alternatively, disclose
their donors. A de minimis level of direct political activity could be
permitted thereby allowing organizations with insignificant amounts
of political activity to avoid the administrative burdens of establishing
a separate political organization or segregated fund.3 65
Subjugation of section 501(c)(4) organizations to the disclosure re-
quirements of section 527 political organizations will likely cause sec-
tion 501(c)(4) organizations to form affiliated political organizations
or create segregated funds regardless of gift tax concerns. Political
activity undertaken by section 501(c)(4) organizations incur transac-
tion costs not similarly incurred by political organizations. These costs
result from the managerial attention required to assure that political
activity is not the primary activity of the organization lest it lose its
tax-exempt status.366
Donors incur agency costs with respect to the funding of political
activity that is not subject to "hard money" restrictions. 367 Direct con-
363. President Nixon attempted to use the IRS to harass persons on his infamous enemies list.
See JoImT Comm. OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAX., INVESTIGATION INTO CERTAIN CHARGES OF
THE USE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES (Dec. 20, 1973) availa-
ble at, https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4038. President Nixon was not
alone in seeking the aid of the IRS for political purposes. See generally JOHN A. ANDREW III,
THE POWER TO DESTROY: THE POLITICAL USES OF THE IRS FROM KENNEDY TO NIXON (2002);
DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS (1989). See also James
Bovard, A Brief History of IRS Political Targeting, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2013, at A15.
364. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
365. Section 84 should be amended to provide that the donation of appreciated property to
fund section 504(c)(4) organizations' political activities is subject to the same treatment as simi-
lar donations to political organizations: a deemed sale of such assets. See supra note 270 and
accompanying text.
366. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
367. Agency costs exist in all relationships in which one party acts on behalf of another.
Agency relationships form among individuals because each individual's decisions affect the
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tributions to a candidate's campaign committee or contributions to
fund expenditures that are closely coordinated with a candidate will
not incur the agency costs that result from unregulated contributions
to independent organizations. Donors to independent organizations
run the risk that such organizations' expenditures are not as helpful to
the candidate as expected. For example, attack advertisements or ex-
cessive focus on a contentious issue may be counterproductive or at
least not as beneficial to a candidate as activities that the candidate's
staff would have undertaken had the expenditures been coordinated
with them. The use of section 501(c)(4) organization as the vehicle
through which independent expenditures are made increases the pos-
sibility of agency costs because, unlike political organizations, section
501(c)(4) organizations must, in order to maintain their tax exempt
status, primarily undertake social welfare activities. Consequently, in
addition to the agency costs made possible by the inability to coordi-
nate political activity with a candidate, donors to social welfare orga-
nizations cannot be assured that their contributions will be used
strictly for political purposes.
If section 501(c)(4) organizations were forced to disclose their do-
nors then any advantage they enjoy over political organizations with
respect to political activity vanishes. In that case, it is unlikely that a
social welfare organization will risk its tax-exempt status by directly
undertaking political activity when nothing is lost by undertaking
those activities through an affiliated political organization or segre-
gated fund.
V. CONCLUSION
Campaign finance reform efforts have either had little effect or,
when effective, generated behavioral responses that largely negated
their intended effect. The distinctions between contributions and ex-
penditures, and between advocacy and non-advocacy, set forth in
Buckley allowed money to flow to independent issue-oriented organi-
zations and political parties. Much of what the McCain-Feingold Act
intended to accomplish was undone by Citizens United. Independent
advocacy is now outside the reach of the campaign finance laws.
Whether Citizens United is an unmitigated disaster or, alternatively, a
long overdue validation of First Amendment principles is beside the
wealth of others, with those decisions often unobservable. The management of this agency rela-
tionship results in the incurrence of monitoring costs by the principal, bonding costs by the agent
to signal fealty to the principal, or some combination of the two. Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976).
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point. Campaign finance practices have shown a propensity to evolve
regardless of the obstacles put in place to limit the political influence,
real or perceived, of money.
The use of the gift tax to achieve goals unmet by campaign finance
laws is unwise. Although the imposition of the tax on donors to sec-
tion 501(c)(4) organizations will, in most likelihood, find statutory and
constitutional support, such imposition will do little to reduce political
expenditures. The impediments that the gift tax places on contribu-
tions that fund the political activities of social welfare organizations
will be overcome by the diversion of donations to section 527 political
organizations. Moreover, social welfare organizations may continue
with their political activities with the funding of large corporations
that are ambivalent toward the gift tax. Enforcement of the gift tax
will also expose the IRS to accusations of political meddling or worse.
Social welfare organizations enjoy a singular advantage over politi-
cal organizations: donor anonymity. The imposition of donor disclo-
sure requirements on such organizations will, for all practical
purposes, drive political activity out of social welfare organizations
and into political organizations. As a result, social welfare organiza-
tions can focus exclusively on their missions, and donors can fund such
missions unburdened from gift tax concerns. The effects of Citizens
United will not be undone by brandishing about the gift tax as a
weapon against donors to one type of organization.
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